Articles

The dangerous logic of Russian revanchism

2009-10-12

The beginning of autumn brought a number of waiting periods in the field of foreign policy to an end. The positive outcome in the Irish referendum was certainly something we had looked forward to, as failure of Europe's major joint project is something we must certainly prevent. Fragmentation is dangerous and in the worst case scenario could leave us without the united support of Europe.

The European Union fact-finding mission's report on the Russia-Georgia war did not bring any surprises. Both Moscow and Tbilisi interpreted the report in their own favour, and no matter how thorough it might have been, nothing could keep it from being used for propaganda purposes. It could actually be said that a propaganda war was waged over the report for some time before it was released. The report was going to come out one way or another, and undoubtedly it was not possible for the mission to avoid the subject of what Saakashvili did wrong. Yet it does not also sidestep the fact that there was consistent pressure from Russia whose aim was to provoke Georgia until the last straw was reached.

At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe we went as far as we could along the path to applying sanctions on Russia in connection with the war against Georgia. Poland and the Baltic States appeared to form somewhat of a distinct bloc, but if we look at the voting results, we actually see that they did not depend so much on the country of origin of any of the representatives but had more to do with everyone's own individual decision. The call to continue "dialogue" seemed somewhat mystifying given that Russia has not complied with a single PACE requirement and only one Russian delegation member was present during the debate.

Recently, I read Tony Judt's interview with Radio Free Europe. Judt is one of the best known historians of our era - his Postwar: The History of Europe from 1945 praises Estonia's economic reforms among others - and now he is explaining how the West is going to be distanced from the Eastern European positions. Judt wants to understand a Russia that has lost such extensive historical areas of influence. The interview contains many interesting but inaccurate comparisons, such as how Americans would feel if they lost Texas and California and if their past leaders were labelled criminals, as people say about Stalin. I would like to add the historical truth that, under Stalin's rule, a huge number of crimes against humanity were committed. Therefore, condemnation of Stalinist crimes is of utmost importance, especially in the Russian Federation.

Analyzing the reasons behind the situation, Judt notes quite correctly the overly rigid positions of Germany and France with regard to Turkey, which have forced an influential country closer to Russia's fold in its search for strategic partnership. I would add to this a number of mistakes that are not favourite topics in the West. A big factor that led to the current situation is the fact that Russia was granted free rein for unchecked military action and human rights violations in Chechnya. The other key point is that Georgia was not given a NATO Membership Action Plan, which was followed by an explosive increase in the number of Russian provocations last year.

We are standing face to face with acquiescent or even vocal acceptance of Russian revanchism. PACE session two weeks ago produced one memorable moment: Olena Bondarenko of Ukraine put a vote on an amendment proposal that Russia must revoke its law allowing the use of force for protecting its citizens beyond its own borders. To which Nataša Jovanovic, deputy speaker of Serbian parliament, declared that Russia was once more a great power and it must have such a right (!) In terms of rhetoric, this was a relatively extreme case, but what is astonishing here is the acknowledgment of how the balance of power has changed: it is becoming all the more plain.

Unfortunately the West is not very conversant in the logic of Russian revanchism, which is the following: the more concessions they make to us, the more we will demand!

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World War II 70 years ago

2009-09-17

September 2009 marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its Secret Protocol, signed on 23 August 1939, opened the way for a joint attack on Poland by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, launched on 1 September 1939 and 17 September 1939 respectively.

The years of war that followed brought about the bloodiest tragedy in the history of mankind. Millions of people perished in the horrors of World War II, and several states lost their independence.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact places the responsibility for the outbreak of World War II on the shoulders of its two contracting states: Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. Whereas both the international community and the post-war Germany condemned the crimes of National Socialism immediately after the end of World War II, the crimes of the Stalinist regime still remain to be unanimously condemned both at international level and by the Russian Federation. Conversely, the recent law of the Russian Federation made " falsification of history" a criminal offence.

Today the divergent view of history is showing the dividing lines within Europe with nearly unprecedented acuteness. As we know, the regained freedom and the opening of archives 20 years ago gave Eastern Europe back its suppressed memory, and this memory says that the crimes of communism were not one iota lesser than those of Nazism. In 2006, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly acknowledged this; this year the European Parliament and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly did so as well. Yet in spite of these clearly expressed positions, Russia is taking actions at the state level in order to justify the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939 and the illegal occupation and annexation of the Baltic States, which took place on a total of two occasions - at the beginning and at the end of the World War II. The rhetoric is aggressive, accusatory and menacing to Russia's neighbours. It has even accused Poland, the first victim of the war, of not giving in to "reasonable demands" on the part of Germany, thus throwing Europe out of an expected equilibrium.

One explanation mooted in mutual discussions by "bolder" Russian politicians as well as by those Western politicians who hesitate to condemn the crimes of communism, is simple: Russia's pride as a traditional empire was severely wounded by the collapse of the Soviet Union and every effort must be made to refrain from pouring salt on those wounds. But the only thing being sought here is the mere historical truth.

Could anyone imagine Hitler being extolled in today's Germany in the same manner in which Stalin is lauded in Russia? Stalin may have committed all sorts of crimes, it is conceded, but at least he put Russia back on its feet. No one would dare to use such demagoguery when talking about Hitler, even though there are ample historical parallels. While Russia still sees those who stood for Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian freedom as enemies, would it be imaginable for the French Resistance to be regarded as the enemy in today's Germany? Certainly not.

In fact today's Germany is a good example of how a clean break has been made with the legacy of totalitarianism and sphere-of-influence politics, in favour of a dedication to securing the future of Europe.

Lasting cooperation is unimaginable in Europe unless all sides come to view historical events in the same open and truthful way. It is time to understand that a proper assessment of the totalitarian communist past, and in particular of the Stalinist crimes, could lead to a deeper understanding and sound future integration of all European nations.

Add comment: www.herkel.net

Es gibt weniger Freiheit als vor fünf Jahren

2009-07-27

Der Fall der inhaftierten Jugendaktivisten beweist für den Europarat-Beobachter Andres Herkel, dass das Regime mehr und mehr auf Repression setzt - Interview

Der Berichterstatter des Europarats für Aserbaidschan, Andres Herkel, beobachtet seit 2004 ein zunehmend problematisches Land: Das Öl- und Gasgeschäft hat die Staatsmacht in Aserbaidschan nur stärker gemacht, stellt der estnische Politiker im Gespräch mit Markus Bernath fest. Auf Kosten der politischen Freiheit, wie der jüngste Fall der zwei jungen inhaftierten Bürgerrechtler zeigt.

Standard: Hat es Sie überrascht, dass die aserbaidschanische Regierung nun auch junge Bürgerrechtsaktivisten ins Visier nimmt, Internetblogger, die nicht mit den traditionellen Oppositionsparteien oder deren Zeitungen verbunden sind?

Herkel: Ich habe das nicht erwartet. Die Probleme mit den Medien in Aserbaidschan sind andererseits bekannt. Als Berichterstatter des Europarats für dieses Land muss ich sagen, dass es weniger Freiheit als vor fünf Jahren gibt. Dieser Fall ist sehr typisch für das, was Journalisten in Aserbaidschan passieren kann.

Standard: Die Richter in Baku haben in einem Berufungsverfahren die zweimonatige Untersuchungshaft gegen Adnan Hajizadeh und Emin Milli aufrechterhalten. Ein Prozess wird folgen. Wie wird das alles enden?

Herkel: Das ist schwer abzuschätzen. Für das Land wäre es das Beste, keine solche schlechte Werbung zu haben. Journalisten, die im Gefängnis sitzen, sind für eine Regierung immer unangenehmer als jene, die in Freiheit sind und arbeiten. Ähnliches widerfuhr zuvor schon anderen - Ganimat Zakhidow zum Beispiel, einem der renommiertesten Journalisten in Aserbaidschan, der auf der Straße angegriffen wurde. Das war ein äußerst zweifelhafter Vorfall. Die übliche Erklärung der Behörden ist dann, dass diese Vorfälle nicht mit der journalistischen Tätigkeit des Verhafteten zusammenhängen. Einen Journalisten kann man leicht einmal wegen "Hooliganismus" anklagen.

Standard: Die landesweite Unterstützung für Präsident Ilham Aliew ist zu keinem Zeitpunkt in den vergangenen Jahren wirklich ins Wanken gekommen. Dennoch greifen die Behörden immer wieder zu plumpen Methoden, um Stimmauszählungen zu korrigieren oder Kritiker mundtot zu machen. Wie erklären Sie sich das? Fühlt sich das Regime nicht sicher?

Herkel: Das ist eine Frage, die man in einem größeren Zusammenhang sehen muss. Aserbaidschan war vor 100 Jahren das erste muslimische Land, das eine Demokratie nach heutigem westlichen Standard einführte. Das hatte nur kurze Zeit Bestand, doch die Gesellschaft war für damalige Verhältnisse durchaus fortschrittlich. Die zweite Unabhängigkeit im Jahr 1991, als die Aserbaidschaner tatsächlich alle Möglichkeiten hatten, brachte ein Gefühl der Enttäuschung: Der Krieg mit Armenien und innere Unruhen kennzeichneten die ersten Jahre. Heute nutzt die Regierung die Einnahmen aus dem Öl- und Gasgeschäft, doch gleichzeitig sind die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse ärmlich.

Aber das Problem mit Aserbaidschan ist größer. Schauen Sie in Richtung Russland - das ist der entscheidende Punkt. Russlands kontrollierte Form von Demokratie gibt es auch in Aserbaidschan und in einigen anderen Staaten des früheren sowjetischen Raums. Die Lage im Europarat, dem Aserbaidschan seit 2001 angehört und wo es Verpflichtungen hat, ist kompliziert, weil es eben einen viel größeren, mächtigen Mitgliedsstaat gibt. Einen, der militärische Aggressionen ausübt, einen Krieg gegen Georgien geführt hat. Diese Dinge drücken die politischen Standards hinunter.

Standard: Untergräbt das nicht die Glaubwürdigkeit des Europarats oder auch der OSZE?

Herkel: In gewissem Maß, ja. Aber man muss das in der historischen Perspektive sehen. Der Europarat hat nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer viele neue Mitglieder erhalten, und für eine internationale Organisation ist das immer ein Problem. Wir haben einen Mechanismus zur Beobachtung von Ländern geschaffen, wir verfolgen, in wie weit rechtsstaatliche Reformen umgesetzt werden. In Osteuropa war das erfolgreich, nicht so aber im Südkaukasus und in Russland. Als Berichterstatter für Aserbaidschan muss ich sagen, dass wir hier noch sehr weit entfernt sind vom Abschluss der Beobachtung. Die meisten politischen Gefangenen wurden in den vergangenen Jahren freigelassen, gleichzeitig ist der Staat aber durch die Einnahmen aus dem Ölgeschäft immer stärker geworden. Der Nebeneffekt: Es gibt heute weniger Raum für freie Meinungsäußerung als vor fünf Jahren, als ich mein Mandat für Aserbaidschan übernahm. Die Gesellschaft wird immer abgeschlossener, kontrollierter.

Herkel: Aserbaidschan ratifiziert Konventionen des Europarats, doch der Fortschritt ist eher formal. Eine der unangenehmsten Überraschungen war dabei das Referendum zur Verfassungsänderung im vergangenen März. Wir haben die Regierung gefragt: Warum haben Sie die Empfehlungen der Venedig-Kommission nicht berücksichtigt? Diese Kommission von Juristen zu Verfassungsfragen hatte sehr schnell eine Einschätzung zur geplanten Gesetzesänderung abgegeben - eine kritische Einschätzung. Doch das Referendum wurde wenige Tage nach der Veröffentlichung des Kommissionsurteils abgehalten. Es war zu spät zu für Änderungen. Bei einem Besuch in Baku habe ich dem Parlamentspräsidenten dann gesagt, es wäre wohl besser, sich vorher zu beraten.

Standard: Wenn kein Lernerfolg sichtbar ist und die bürgerlichen Freiheiten immer weiter beschnitten werden, ist es dann nicht Zeit für den Europarat, über Konsequenzen nachzudenken? Etwa eine Suspendierung der Mitgliedschaft eines Landes ins Auge zu fassen?

Herkel: Das ist eine sehr heikle Angelegenheit. Im Fall Russlands ist das erwogen worden, und nach dem Beginn des zweiten Tschetschenienkriegs von 1999 auch kurzzeitig erfolgt. Suspendierung ist dabei ein zu starker Begriff. Es geht um die Aussetzung des Stimmrechts einer Delegation in der parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats. Nach den sehr problematischen Parlamentswahlen in Aserbaidschan vom November 2005 ist ebenfalls die Frage einer solcher Suspendierung im Europarat aufgekommen. Persönlich bin ich der Meinung, erst recht nach dem Krieg in Georgien, dass wir stärker zu unseren Grundprinzipien stehen müssen. Ich schließe nicht die Möglichkeit aus, dass wir einen solchen Schritt gegenüber der Russischen Föderation ergreifen, vor allem, weil bestimmte Resolutionen nicht erfüllt wurden. Danach können wir uns mit der Frage anderer Mitgliedsstaaten wie Aserbaidschan beschäftigen. Unser Engagement für unser Werte und Standards würde dann sehr viel überzeugender sein. (Markus Bernath, derStandard.at, 27.7.2009)

ZUR PERSON: Andres Herkel (46) ist seit 2004 Berichterstatter der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats für Aserbaidschan. Er gehört seit 1999 dem estnischen Parlament an und ist Mitglied der rechtskonservativen Vaterlandsunion. (www.herkel.net, www.coe.int)

The street is no place for constitutional democracy

2009-04-15

The week-long protests in Moldova and Georgia - the latter in particular - should compel us to ask hard questions about the substance and aims of street politics. Even a cursory glance tells us that there is a world of difference between these protests and Estonia's Singing Revolution and their multihued brethren. Back then and in movements such as the Orange Revolution, people were protesting against illegitimate powers or stolen elections, but what is the target now?

Georgians are simply calling for the president to resign. In Moldova, the bone of contention is the recent election results. Very well - in Moldova at least a recount can be held, and thus the question hanging in the balance is whether the communists will be able to elect the president in parliament from their own ranks, or whether they will fall one vote short. In Georgia, the issue does not rest on votes or the elections, as the last elections are long past and there is plenty of time until the new ones.

Mass demonstrations can help countries on to the path of democracy, if the old regime is in spiritual and moral decay. But imagine if the Singing Revolution in Estonia had been followed by additional political shifts supported by large popular gatherings. Where would we be then? In the European Union? More than doubtful. In the Republic of Estonia? Perhaps, but even that is no certainty.

Popular movements and street-level protests may result in changes - after an occupation that has lasted half a century. But if such tactics begin to be employed as a universal method for regime change, something is out of whack. In a democracy, a change of government occurs through free and fair elections. Â If elections were clearly stolen, then there is a burden of proof. If people are discontent with their president, then they must either wait until the next elections or resort to parliamentary action.

I must say I am very surprised by Nino Burjanadze. For years she was seen as the one person who could, in an opposition role, become a balancing force between the impetuous president Saakashvili and an overly radical opposition. But now it is former speaker of parliament Burjanadze who says that dialogue is impossible and that politics must remain out on the street. Former Georgian Ambassador to the UN Irakli Alasania is more open to dialogue. The actual parliamentary opposition represented by the Christian Democrats has refrained from any support for the politics of the street.

The situation is more complicated in Moldova. The young people who attacked the government buildings in Chisinau would leave a more credible impression if they had served as election-day observers, doing the kind of work that was done in Georgia prior to the Rose Revolution. Each ballot was recorded, and at the end of the day it was known how many slips were cast in a givenÂ precinct, and this made the fraud obvious. But no such effort was mounted in Moldova. Why? Now there is a choice: politics of the street, a constitutional crisis (which will not be resolved by newÂ elections, either) or a political dialogue.

Anyone who thinks that Estonia (or some other country) should support a specific party or specific politician in transition countries, is in error. It is not at all a good idea to compartmentalize the political landscape of other countries, viewing the "colour-coded" revolutionaries Saakashvili and Yushchenko as good to the core and the others as "bad". Neither is it a good idea to think that anyone who organizes a demonstration or issues an incitation to civil disobedience is a noble flagship of freedom of speech and a bard of freedom.

Estonia must support the democratic process and free societies. Naturally we can use development aid to support the governments of both Georgia and Moldova. This sort of cooperation will continue on condition that a change in government can take place as a result of free and fair elections.

Street riots cannot be the mechanism for such change. It should also be borne in mind that Russian interests play a role in both countries and that internal unrest can be exploited for unsavoury purposes.

Open market is the answer

2009-04-02

The annual Lennart Meri conference organized by the International Centre for Defense Studies gathered in Tallinn last week, bringing together a large amount of foreign political experts and thinkers, journalists, ministers and politicians from around the globe. Over the years, the Lennart Meri conference has become a major event not only in the Baltics but in European politics as a whole, where the people from whom foreign political decisions depend can discuss the most intriguing questions in a free atmosphere.
While in earlier conferences the target was mostly on foreign policy, this time it was not possible to avoid the economy - especially economic crises currently ravaging the entire world.

The main reason for such interest was a question asked in one plenary of the conference - would the current economic crises lead to the same result as the Great Depression in 1930s, to the fall of democracy and rise of totalitarianism, which at the end would lead the world to a new devastating war?

This is a serious question. To answer this question we must first look at the real situation in the Central and Eastern European countries, declared by the world press as the main source of instability in Europe. Actually the picture is more diversified.

First, while in the short term new member states can really be in trouble, in the longer term it is not so clear - if the "old European" countries don't actually have even bigger problems. Their response to the crises, to print more money or to let countries fall into a deep deficit, is a dangerous gamble with the European future, which can at the end threaten us all. It might be soon clear that several Western European countries are actually in more trouble than Central and Eastern European countries.

So we reach the second point - the situation is bad in some new member states, but the majority of them are doing not so badly. When Eurostat finds that the economic growth in "old Europe" will be -0.1 percent, then in new member states it will be nearly 2.5 percent. In 2008 Eurostat found that one of the most radical reformers in CEE, Slovakia, had the highest economic growth rate in Europe at 4.9 percent. The biggest economy among the new member states, Poland, is also doing well, which is good news to all its trading partners among new countries.

At the same time countries in the region that are not yet members of the European Union are in trouble. Especially dangerous is the situation in Ukraine, which has failed to pass necessary reforms and concentrated instead on internal political fighting.

Looking at some countries that are in trouble among the new member states, we may say that often this is the result of their own mistakes. The Hungarian socialist government has made some of the most devastating mistakes during their eight years in power, transforming Hungary from one of most developed countries in CEE to one of the most problematic. Hungary needs elections quickly - otherwise the economic crises could grow into a political one. Unfortunately, it seems this will not happen as the socialists are trying to remain in power as long as possible.

Another country in trouble, Latvia, has also made mistakes. Weak governments, political instability and a high level of corruption - combined with high spending and Russian influence in economic matters - has created a very difficult situation. There is a new government in power in Latvia and we must wish them the best of success.

But freedom still works. This must be the main message of the G20 gathering. When we come out of this crisis, the world will need less protectionism and more free trade. When we stress the importance of freedom only in words and not in real acts, we may all go down.

On the European level this means that the rules must be the same for everybody. Countries in the eurozone can let their budgets dip into deep deficits, then for the applicant countries there is a deficit limit of 3 percent - and I must say, for good reasons. At the same time, all of us know that huge deficits are some new kind of protectionism, targeted at spending more and supporting falling economies. This is not a fair game and can lead Central and Eastern Europe into a real crisis.

Finally, we must ask ourselves the question: do we have a single market in reality or not? We know that the market is actually only partly open. The best thing one can do for Europe is to help new member states overcome the crises by letting the market free, introducing a single market in reality and overcoming protectionism. This is the real way out of the crisis.

Mart Laar, a historian and statesman, served as Prime Minister of Estonia from 1992 - 1994, and from 1999 - 2002. He is currently chairman of the Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica Party (IRL). He wrote this article for The Baltic Times.

The Council of Europe: a sleeping beauty

2009-03-16

Sometimes it is said, that the Council of Europe is Europe's only value-based organisation. The assertion is based on the fact that the Council of Europe's competence is restricted to the most traditional value spheres: human rights, democracy, free elections, gender quality, rule of law and due process. Other organizations have their own concerns, such as security and economic cooperation. True, adherence to values is also among the prerequisites for becoming a member of the European Union, and in fact experience shows that it is actually the European Union that holds the bar as high as it is. Going by the European Union's yardstick, a number of Council of Europe member states are about as far from EU membership as the moon is from the sun. The European Union gave its biggest discount in admitting Bulgaria and Romania, even though in the context of the Council of Europe, these countries were either partially or completely exempted from monitoring long ago.

However, the most striking characteristic of the Council of Europe is the fact that Russia is a member of the organization and an unceasing source of problems. This is the real source of the devaluation of standards and the constant internal strife that leaves no time for focusing earnestly on serious work toward strengthening democracy.

I would argue that the Council of Europe has gave a discount both by admitting Russia and the countries of the southern Caucasus, and by ending monitoring in Turkey. In spite of the fact that Belarus has not met the acceptance criteria due to Lukashenka's dictatorship, "better in than out" arguments have never ceased and internal pressure for a détente with Belarus continues apace. Among other things, this stems from the fact that the organization includes, alongside Russia, members such as Armenia, Azerbaijan. The two latter countries may have irreconcilable differences over Karabakh, but in other questions they might form a united front of countries that have a controlled democracy. A popular notion in recent times is the idea that smaller countries should not be called to order for lack of democracy, because the situation is worse in Russia. But this leads to a vicious circle - Russia cannot be taken to task just because it is Russia. Let us recall that military aggression against another member state - Georgia - and the subsequent failure to comply with the peace plan did not result in any sanctions.

Thus the Council of Europe is the only organization that according to the letter of the law is based purely on values, yet at the same time these are values that have been on a clearance sale for some time. When Russia became a member of the Council of Europe in winter 1996, Mart Nutt wrote in Postimees that it was the end of the Council of Europe - that in other words, it would soon become a powerless organization, much like the UN or the OSCE. The inconvenient question of whether the Council of Europe has influenced Russia in the direction of democracy or whether Russia has instead influenced the Council of Europe toward less democracy is clearly a salient one. In my opinion, resolving this question in accordance with values will be the number one task facing the incoming general secretary of the Council of Europe, whether his name is van den Brande, Eörsi , Jagland or Cimoczewicz.

The full structure of the Council of Europe consists of a number of interrelated bodies: the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the European Court of Human Rights and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. Adjacent buildings house the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the so-called Venice Commission, charged with the task of providing advisory opinions to member states in matters of constitutional law. The organization's secretary general, elected by the Assembly, is a political "steward" who has the sole right and duty to speak on behalf of all bodies - i.e. the Council of Europe as a whole.

Actually, the Council of Europe's architecture is fairly well-designed. My experiences as a rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly in Azerbaijan confirm that, in the presence of good will and cooperation, various substructures are able to operate effectively and send uniform signals to problem countries. The Assembly's rapporteur exchanges information on a running basis with the secretary general's Special Representative, who keeps his finger on developments at all times. The Assembly's reports set the tone for the diplomats representing the member states in Strasbourg, who visit monitoring subjects periodically accompanied by delegations. If disputes arise within a country with regard to electoral laws, freedom of speech and limits on presidential powers, they go before the Venice Commission, which issues its opinion. If a given member state does not itself request an expert opinion, the Assembly does so at the behest of the rapporteurs. For example, I am currently waiting for an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the content of a referendum to be held in Azerbaijan, where tens of questions at a time will be brought up before the people, including abolishing the restriction on the number of consecutive presidential terms, currently set at two.

Again, based on my personal experience, I must say that even harder than creating a working atmosphere between the substructures of the Council of Europe is achieving political unanimity on how to evaluate and treat the issues facing a country that is subject to monitoring. My latest experience with presidential elections in Azerbaijan last autumn was that a number of Assembly members displayed a frightening readiness to disregard the general situation with freedom of speech and human rights and focus solely on observation of the procedural flow on election day. In my opinion, this is an extremely dangerous development, for in this way we would quickly find ourselves giving the Assembly's blessing to authentically Soviet-style elections . The only difference is that in the interests of greater credibility, they are no longer chasing 99.9 per cent turnout and as overwhelming a level of support for the "official" candidate. No, it is much more smarter to show Europe 60-70% turnout and support, which in a closed society and controlled democracy can be achieved without resorting to major fraud. Before Azerbaijan, such an election model was employed by Russia - exactly a year ago, Dmitri Medvedev was placed on the presidential throne in the stead of Vladimir Putin.

The other example is how the agenda for Assembly sessions is developed and how quickly initiatives are transformed into reports. In the case of monitoring, a simple rule applies: a major comprehensive report is prepared once every two years. Based on necessity and the discretion of the rapporteurs, supplementary reports may be produced in the interim period, focusing on a more specialized area such as freedom of speech, rule of law, elections or political prisoners. Yet the reports are distributed very unevenly. In a speech given last year, I presented a summary in which I stated that while three monitoring reports had been released on Russia since it became a member in 1996, but other countries with major problems have received much more attention. Seven reports have been issued on Armenia and Azerbaijan, but this occurred in a much shorter period of time - from 2001, when they became members of the Council of Europe.

Russia is not only a country that faces more serious problems, but it also has the greatest population and its territory extends through 11 time zones. How can it possibly be viewed in the same category as microscopic Monaco, which has only one strike against it - a constitutional defect that favours princely rule and a lack of parliamentarism?

Special reports would help focus attention on major human rights problems in large countries. From time to time, such reports have been prepared on persecuted journalists. The main characters in such reports have included the journalist Grigori Pasko, who was convicted of treason in Russia (2003) and the investigative journalist Georgi Gongadze who was murdered in Ukraine in 2000, the investigation of whose case has been bogged down, even after the Orange Revolution. Special reports have been released on the Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos affair in Russia (2005) and on the situation facing the Finno-Ugric peoples (Katrin Saks, 2006). The human rights situation in Chechnya has not received attention from the Assembly since 2005 - although a new report covering the human rights situation in the entire Northern Caucasus is being prepared in the Legal Affairs committee .

In many cases, the initiative for preparing a special report covering one country has been rejected on the grounds that the problem must be included in the supervision committee's general report. For example, the general report on Russia from 2005 is thorough and it is a good document, but four years have passed with no follow-up report. True, in the more charitable view, the last two reports on the Russia-Georgia war could be viewed as special reports on Russia - i.e. a critical alibi for the fact that the primary report was postponed yet another time.

If there is political resolve, the Assembly and the Council of Europe as a whole are capable of very good work. Unfortunately political resolve is not determined only by values but also by the interests of the member states and readiness to stand up for the values. The Assembly operates on the principle of a political parliament, and therefore it is no wonder that in the wake of admitting problem states, the nature of the values itself becomes a matter of heated debate. For example, what is a human rights violation and what is not? Or can a controlled democracy and the imitation of democratic institutions be considered compliance with obligations assumed before the Council of Europe? At critical junctures, sometimes conscience can prevail as in the Assembly's last winter session, when all of the strong formulations dropped by rapporteurs due to Russian back door diplomacy were inserted into the Russia-Georgia resolution in a round of amendment proposals. Unfortunately such a concentrated effort is not made very often.

The Committee of Ministers, which operates on the basis of consensus, has for the most part a weaker grip than the Parliamentary Assembly, and the attempt made by Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt to prove that the opposite was true - undertaken in sorting out the Russia-Georgia conflict - did not meet with the hoped-for success.

***
To this point, I have discussed the Parliamentary Assembly, since this is the institution that I have direct experience with. Still, I consider the Council of Europe's most effective tool to be the European Court of Human Rights, established in 1959. The court issues its rulings; this is above dispute on the political level. At the same time, there is greater interest in turning to the Court to seek justice, a major part of the increased interest stems from countries where democracy is shackled. There is currently a backlog of 100,000 unresolved court cases. It will thus take years for a ruling to be issued. In the case of the war crimes committed by Russian authorities in the beginning if the second Chechnya war, it would undoubtedly be practical for rulings to be handed down rapidly by the Court. But in fact it took years. Acts that were for the most part committed in 2000 or 2001 were classified by the Court as war crimes only starting in 2006. And the docket is only getting longer.

In 2004, Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights was drafted, its primary goal being to simplify the work of the court - i.e., to clear the proverbial desk of matters with repetitive or clearly inappropriate content. For example, the protocol would allow a single judge and an assistant to carry out an initial examination instead of using a committee of three judges. The President of the Court, Jean-Paul Costa, has expressed an opinion that implementing Protocol 14 would reduce the case load by about 25%. Currently, for the third year in a row, there is a situation where ratification of the protocol requires a decision by Russia to proceed. This is intentional sabotage of Court of Human Rights reform process. On what motives is this being done? I think that putting the brakes on court cases that are inconvenient for Russia is only one part of the reason. In fact, this foot-dragging is hampering the functioning of the entire organization. If Russia would take it upon itself to ratify protocol 14 after all at some point, we could predict a "long-term sense of gratitude", that would help drop other issues related to Russia from the agenda for some time.

It is naïve to think that Protocol 14 alone would help resolve the problems that have come up before the Court of Human Rights in the last few decades. In addition to the sheer quantity of appeals, the court is also facing essential dilemmas. In the vision of Old Europe, the Court of Human Rights exists as a beacon to shine light into grey areas that are intellectually interesting and where international jurisprudence is lacking. After the energetic enlargement of the organization, it now finds itself having to deal with defects in the domestic judicial system. It turns out that the judiciary is not independent in all countries, after all; it can be bought or used by the executive branch as a tool for political repression. In such a situation, the European Court of Human Rights is actually the only place where some sort of justice can be had.

The two abovementioned contexts for intervention could not be more unlike each other. One case might involve a very complicated and, for Western Europe, sensitive issue concerning morality, such as euthanasia. Another case might be a simple fabrication where the court must substantiate that the accusation brought against a journalist who was critical of a government was a sham or improper in form. Thus the court has to operate according to two different paradigms - handing down substantive law, and performing supervision in order to keep legal nihilism in check. It will undoubtedly become clear in the course of this activity how different our continent really is.

The importance of the time factor cannot be greater. In April 2006, leading Azeri journalist Einulla Fatullayev was given a long prison sentence. He was accused of incitement to terrorism after he speculated in an newspaper editorial about a possible role for Azerbaijan in a war against Iran. Fatullayev was also convicted of defaming the state and defiling the memory of those killed in the Karabakh conflict. In a series of articles based on refugees' recollections, called "A Karabakh Diary", he mooted a version that Armenians were not the only ones to blame in the killing of a number of civilians in the Hodzhaly tragedy in 1992 (which the Azeris often call a genocide). If Fatullayev's article is to be believed, partial responsibility also resides with Azerbaijan's armed forces, who conducted themselves poorly and disseminated misinformation to the population. In September 2006, Fatullayev sought recourse from the European Court of Human Rights.

As a rapporteur, it is not possible for me to neglect to give my own evaluation of the Fatullayev case. Besides the Council of Europe, his imprisonment has been criticized by the OSCE, Reporters without Borders and a number of human rights organizations. Fatullayev is a symbol of freedom of speech denied. In reality, he penned a number of articles that were significantly more critical of the authorities than the ones for which he was convicted. Yet nothing will have been settled with finality until the Court of Human Rights has issued its ruling. In such a situation the logjam at the Court is very unpleasant. Delaying the work of the Court certainly does not interfere with the work of just one rapporteur, but the activity of the Council of Europe as a whole.

New measures are also being implemented in order to further entrench the logjam. Last autumn, the Court was flooded with around three thousand complaints against Georgia, all in the same content and style, all tied to alleged human rights violations in South Ossetia. As noted above, all of these cases must be examined by a three-judge committee. On one hand, it is difficult to hold anything against anyone, as everything conforms to procedure. Yet it is obvious that the large number of petitions was something achieved by a well-directed campaign. This is very different from the complaints brought against Russia in the second Chechnya war, where people risked their own and their relatives' lives and safety. The reports issued by the Assembly and other human rights organizations have also detailed cases in which an appellant to the Court of Human Rights or their relatives have had to endure repressions and persecution.

In short, the problems facing the Court of Human Rights can be likened to two knots in need of unravelling. The system was created half a century ago for an organization with few member states, and now it has clearly outlived its usefulness. The number of court cases was fairly small decades ago, but today, it is a different picture. It is actually the second coming of the same problem, as a reform carried through in 1998 installed permanent judges for the first time. The goal was the same - to cope with a growing number of appeals. The other problem is directly related to Russia. It is likely that Russia wants to belong to the Council of Europe but not be a member of the European Court of Human Rights system. Because this option is not possible, they have resorted to torpedoing the work of the court.

***
If we generalize the comments made regarding the Court, we come to the conclusion that the Council of Europe has long ceased to be the organization it was created to be in 1949. Back then, it was a community of democratic countries that adopted a stance in opposition to another bloc of countries with an undemocratic system. After the Berlin Wall came down, there was an illusion that the spread of democracy would be painless, and that countries cold be admitted at a discount in order to accelerate democratization. But in fact it was this very discount, offered to Russia in 1996, that has proved the source of great problems. Back then, it was expected that Russia would resolve the Chechnya question in a peaceful manner, but in fact a new, even bloodier war ensued, and fragile democracy took a major step in reverse in the Putin era.

Yet it cannot be said that the Council of Europe has been painted into a corner. The structure is in working order; there just needs to be the political will to implement the structure more effectively. The current situation is characterized by the fact that a number of countries are opting for the use of political tactics to deflect criticism. Work toward better compliance with standards human rights and democracy is relegated to the background. The battle for conformity to standards has largely been supplanted with the fight for standards as such. This is overtly a political battle, where geopolitical interests and other such considerations are being pitted against values.

It is for this reason that the Council of Europe is reminiscent of a sleeping beauty, not to mention the Frog Prince, waiting for a kiss to re-awaken it to life.

Published in Diplomaatia, March 2009

Future and disharmony

2009-02-19

At the Munich security conference, US Vice-President Joe Biden signalled that the new administration wants a fresh start to Russia relations. While important as a message, giving substance to this desire will be a complicated task.

Consider the kinds of fresh starts we have seen from Munich in recent years. Two years ago, then Russian president Vladimir Putin surprised even the greatest Russia sceptics. delivering a vitriolic presentation full of sharp contrasts and references to Cold War and geopolitical imperialism.

Last year in Munich, Vice Premier Minister Ivanov provoked the West, declaring that recognizing Kosovo would open a Pandora's box. If we consider Russia's aggression against Georgia and Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be the opening of that box, then we can say that Russia made good on its promise, half a year later.

Thus the pressure policy seen in Munich in the past three years can be seen as fairly worrisome. In 2007, Russia had an verbal attack, in 2008 it threatened, and now America is offering an olive branch. True, Biden did clearly indicate that the US does not ever intend to accept the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

And while some analysts thought that the new vice-president might also disown the Eastern European missile shield Moscow opposes, this did not happen, either. Biden was heralding the beginning of a new presidential era in America, one that will offer new opportunities - for Russia, Europe and the United States.

The Russian media covered Biden's proffered hand in friendship as a triumph for the current pressure policy, but it is far from certain that the future will bear out such a facile interpretation. It was actually more as if Biden was giving the Kremlin a chance to get off to a new start, so that it could move away from the confrontationism expressed by Putin to a more open dialogue.

Now that the economic crisis has deepened, it may be better understood in Moscow that any new flexing of geopolitical muscles (Chechnya, Georgia) will prove a Pyrrhic victory. But we can't hold our breath, either, for common sense to return.

As for assessing various development scenarios, it is a very unfavourable time to predict anything. The crisis is creating its own harsh realities, and predictions made on the basis of what we know today have a short shelf life.

Indeed, Western politicians were not able to draw adequate conclusions from the geopolitical message in Putin's Munich speech, even though there was a year and a half in which to do that. Then came the August war and - maybe even a greater factor - the economic crisis and collapse in the price of oil.

Analyzing Putin's Munich speech spawned conclusions, of course - take for instance Edward Lucas's The New Cold War, a book that has received good reviews in Estonia as well. Of course, Lucas examines Russia's development over a longer perspective, and Putin's aggressive language only gives credence to his observations that Russia has dug in for a Cold War.

But when the architect of Kosovo's independence Martti Ahtisaari came to Estonia several months ago as a fresh Nobel laureate, he asserted that talk of a new Cold War is "utter nonsense". It might have been more accurate to say that talk of Cold War no longer made sense, as the price of crude oil had started dropping during this time and Russia's capability to play the leading role in the global conflict declined with each day.

We should also take note the so-called power audit conducted by Mark Leonardi and Micu Popescu regarding EU-Russia relations at the behest of the European Foreign Relations council in November 2007.

Yes, it is true that even some of the positions in what is otherwise a brilliant analysis have become dated in just a short period of time.
For example, Leonard and Popescu argue that while in the early 1990s Russia depended on Western credit, now Russia has one of the largest currency reserves and the West depends on Russian gas. Gas dependence still persists, but Russia's cash reserves are bring depleted at an unforeseen rate. Leonard and Popescu say that Europe must be able to get its position across, too, by making clear that not only is Europe dependent on Russia, but that Russia is dependent on the possibility of selling energy to Europe.

Now, 15 months later, Russia is seeing what the dependency on the European market actually means. However severely the crisis will hit the West, it isn't likely that its impact on the West will be quite as extensive as it will be for the Russian economy. Even if the oil price were to hold steady at an optimistic level of 50 dollars per barrel, some estimate Russian export revenue would be halved. We haven't even reached the drop in the price of gas; it still lies ahead.

Other problems include bad loans, decaying infrastructure and capital flight. In a general depression, everyone suffers and no doubt Estonia will suffer more than the average, but the tragedy facing our big eastern neighbour is that their entire economy is built on raw material and energy prices.

At the same time, we cannot be too optimistic that the West will be able to take advantage of a weaker Russia in global competition or call it more forcefully back to the fold of democracy and rule of law, as Leonard and Popescu recommend.

Instead, a second Great Depression will force countries to become more introverted and adopt protectionist measures. President Obama's administration is shying away from the US's role as global policeman created by Bush - an image that has in many respects been a failure,

Let us recall that during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the democratic form of government tended to be supplanted by an authoritarian regime even in some "normal" countries. I wouldn't want to forecast such a dark scenario for our near future, but the question of the future of "semi-free" countries and societies is certainly relevant.

The hope that the loss of oil revenue could make Russia a more liberal country would seem credible if the West were a more open and stronger role model than it is capable of being in the years to come. The FSB and Putin faction have achieved such sovereign control of power that it would be naïve to hope for a peaceful easing based on simple politico-economic expediency.

In the long term, I side with the theoreticians who note that Russia has always had repeated periods of authoritarian mobilization but that the repressions are always followed by a new thaw. This was the case after Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Stalin. No doubt a thaw will arrive after Putin.

At the same time, I am not at all sure that we have seen everything yet from the latter -- the war in Chechnya, muzzling of the opposition and destruction of the free press and civic society. Cynically speaking, this is child's play next to the large-scale repressions seen earlier in history. But when the economic collapse is really upon us and power is put to the test, this regime could go much further.

Thus the question is whether Russia's depression will prove to be also full of repression or - in the best case scenario - whether depression will itself be considered sufficiently repressive. No doubt it will last a fairly long time, and if radical reforms are reached, it will only be through great hardship. Yet if Russia completes this torturous and long cycle, it can be much stronger than before and hopefully more democratic as well.

***

I find myself leaving aside the wisdom in hindsight - that all this was inevitable in light of all the bad loans and global pyramid schemes - and thinking increasingly about the crisis in terms of a purifying force. The rhetorically noble part of the international system that protects freedom and humanistic values has long been rusty - or rather, it has run up against opposing forces that are too strong.

Actually, by August of last year, Russia's development had become a threat to the humanitarian aspect of the international cooperative system as a whole. The August war simply put the formal seal on the geopolitical hegemony. The Estonian, Lithuanian and Polish presidents are not enough to stand up against it.

At the same time, a new, unforeseen and, for players on the political spectrum, undesirable force began exerting an influence - the global crisis. It will change the world significantly, but we do not yet know how. It's a matter of guesswork. I concur strongly with David Vseviov, who said in Postimees on 10 February that the current crisis cannot be seen narrowly in terms of weighing its economic root causes or conclusions. It is a crisis of values.

I would add here that it also appears that way in the international perspective. Only that we are dealing with different types of societies and value systems that are all entering a change phase at the same time.

And to come back to Biden's speech, what America was saying, in all its new openness, is that it actually has no idea as to what colour the light will be when it appears at the end of the tunnel.

Freedom Is Still the Best Policy

2009-02-13

Eastern Europe won't be looking for government-led recovery.

It is said that the only thing that people learn from history is that people learn nothing from history. Looking at how the world is handling the current economic crisis, this aphorism appears sadly true.

World leaders have forgotten how the collapse of Wall Street in 1929 developed into a world-wide depression. It happened not thanks to market failures but as a result of mistakes made by governments which tried to protect their national economies and markets. The market was not allowed to make its corrections. Government interventions only prolonged the crisis.

We may hope that, even as we see several bad signs of neo-interventionist attitude, all the mistakes of the 1930s will not be repeated. But it is clear that the tide has turned again. Capitalism has been declared dead, Marx is honored, and the invisible hand of the market is blamed for all failures.

This is not fair. Actually it is not markets that have failed but governments, which did not fulfill their role of the "visible hand" -- creating and guaranteeing market rules. Weak regulation of the banking sector and extensive lending, encouraged by governments, are examples of this failure.

At the same time, it is clear that the invisible hand still points the way out of crises. It is easy to see when we look at how the postcommunist transition countries are tackling the economic crisis. After the collapse of communism, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries launched several radical reforms and achieved remarkable economic growth. Some of these countries have trusted the invisible hand more, others less. As a result, not only have the results of reforms been different, but the impact of economic crises as well.

During the 1990s, the most radical and successful reforms came from the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Open markets, economic liberalization, fast privatization, stable currencies, flat tax rates -- all of these became the trademark of the "Baltic Tigers." Early in the new millennium, the Baltic countries started to enjoy the fruits of their reforms. Economic growth reached 11% to 12% per year. Living standards rose to 60% to 70% of the European average from 15% to 20% in 1992.

Yet times of rapid growth are unfortunately not always times of good decisions. Governments thought they could afford a Western-style welfare state because the economy was doing so well. Conservative financial policy was weakened, lending was encouraged, chances to join the euro zone were missed, and social expenditures rose beyond the economy's ability to bear them.

Combine these mistakes with corruption, weak government and loose control of the banking sector, and the results can be very difficult -- as in Latvia, which had to take out a loan from the IMF. Countries with a more effective visible hand, such as Lithuania and Estonia, are doing much better. Estonia is cutting nearly 10% of its government budget, relying more on the market than on state intervention, and hoping to keep its finances under control so that it can join the euro zone by 2011.

The situation is even better in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe. While the European Commission last month projected the euro-zone economy to contract by 1.9% this year, most new member states' economies are forecast to grow. The most positive developments are in countries that have learned from the Baltic experience and introduced radical economic reforms. They have even learned from the mistakes of the Baltic States -- and not tried to become too rich too fast. The "best" reformer in Central and Eastern Europe, Slovakia, introduced a flat 19% universal tax rate and launched other reforms, allowing Slovakia to join the euro zone last month. The Commission predicts that Slovakia will have the highest economic growth rate in Europe this year, at 2.7%. At the same time Hungary, which has been very cautious on reforms, has been hit harder by the crisis than the more radical reformers, and like Latvia is now dependent on the IMF.

The same experience is seen in former Soviet republics. Russia has been slow in its economic reforms and built up an authoritarian state; it was hit especially badly by the economic crisis. Russia's aggression against Georgia last August and its gas war with Ukraine this January have made the crisis only worse for the Russian people. The trust of foreign investors is gone, and capital is quickly escaping Russia.

Georgia, on the other hand, has followed a very different policy. It has fought against corruption, is building up stronger democratic institutions, and has supported a good business climate, which the World Bank ranks 18th in the world. Making the visible hand more effective has allowed Georgia to trust the invisible hand of the market. This in turn has helped Georgia -- against all odds -- overcome the results of Russian aggression with surprising ease so far. Like the rest of the world, Georgia was hit by the recession. But the response of its government was not to increase taxes, but to cut them and continue with reforms. Georgia's response to the crisis has, according to the IMF's latest report, been more successful than anybody hoped.

So as we see, freedom still works. Moving the world away from free choice and restoring the power of Big Brother is not the right answer to our current problems.

Mr. Laar was prime minister of Estonia from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2002. He has advised the Georgian government on economics.

Time to Take the Riddle Out of Russia

2009-02-03

The Moscow Times » Issue 4077 » Opinion

Europe's view of Russia frequently reflects misconceptions. Some Europeans hide behind Winston Churchill's famous -- but often misrepresented -- comment that Russia is a mystery, riddle and an enigma. Others adhere to a naive, visionary optimism about Moscow's understanding of democracy and the rule of law.

But neither view reflects the true nature of Russia. What Europe needs is a healthy and robust realpolitik, one that is free from illusions about the giant next door. Past experience shows that there is nothing mysterious or enigmatic about Russia's pursuit of its national (even imperialist) interests. The trick for Europe is to counterbalance Russian self-interest, and this means the EU has to agree on -- and jointly promote -- Europe's own interests and channel relations with Moscow into an international framework that upholds the rule of law.

The danger of taking Churchill's phrase at face value has been clear enough for some 80 years, especially at times of crisis. Western leaders have used it as an excuse for making ignoble compromises that undermined Western values, and Eastern Europe suffered the tragic results of these compromises after World War II. The "Russian-riddle" mindset is still to be found in the confusion and hesitation of Western policymakers who often desperately try to reconcile their strategic and pragmatic interests with a democratic code of conduct, even though Russia mostly ignores such international standards.

Viewing Russian behavior as a riddle also reinforces Moscow's traditional position of being a country with a unique role in history -- one that is allowed to function outside any existing political or national models. Moscow expects people to make an exception in Russia's case, and its refusal to ratify and implement the Energy Charter was just one example of this conduct.

It would be far better if Europe rigorously applied internationally recognized standards when judging Moscow's actions. These standards should include reciprocity based on common democratic values and the rule of law. There was a chance to start implementing such a policy in 1991, when the West had "won" the Cold War. Instead, the West fell for the second great illusion about Russia -- that provided the opportunity, and enough freedom and plenty of Western goodwill, it would transform itself into a democratic society and respect the rule of law. This optimistic view ignored the question of whether post-Soviet Russia had sufficient goodwill of its own to make such a transition, even when it refused to make moral or political judgements about its totalitarian past.

Deluded by its own mistaken views of Russia, Europe has failed to find a coherent and realistic strategy on how to deal with its biggest neighbor.

Anti-democratic developments in Russia make it essential to understand where in real terms we stand vis-a-vis Russia. This is all the more urgent as spin doctors are busy creating new illusions around the personality of President Dmitry Medvedev. Depending on who you listen to, Medvedev is either a new John Kennedy or he's a harmless technocrat with no KGB background. Western leaders who buy into such illusions and race one another to the gates of the Kremlin demonstrate a classic case of European confusion regarding Russia.

What, then, are the current realities that should inform a more accurate EU analysis of Russia? First, we have to acknowledge that Russia is not a democracy. In fact, the policy of building a "normal" society that respects the rule of law has been reversed. Under the guise of "sovereign democracy," Russia openly and defiantly abandons the goal of becoming an advanced open society, marked by political liberty and the rule of law.

That does not mean that Russia is the same as the Soviet Union, but Europe must stop thinking of Russia as a "normal" strategic partner. While the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement declares common values as the basis of a partnership, this is deceptive. We can speak about common interests, certainly, but not common values. Russia no longer aims to integrate with the West under Western terms and conditions.

The European Union should forget any notion that Russia is a friend, ally or reliable partner. Russia's strategic interests in Europe directly oppose those of the EU. Moscow wants to split the EU apart and is trying to set old and new member states against each other. The former Soviet-occupied Baltic states are the main target and testing ground for these divisive policies. Russia combines political and economic pressure on the three Baltic states with disinformation campaigns and the exploitation of Soviet-era immigrants. Russia has also tried to turn these EU members into bargaining chips in possible future deals with the EU.

Energy is a sector where the EU needs to get a real grip on today's realities. The EU is increasingly dependent on Russian oil and on gas, but a more sober economic analyses show that Russia needs the EU more than the EU needs Russia.

European companies continue, meanwhile, to do business with Russia despite its flagrant disregard for Western norms, its dramatic lack of reciprocity and its general disdain for legal guarantees. They rush into Russian markets in search of short-term gain and accept the crippling moral price of having to share their profits with the ruling elite. The business practices involved cast aside most EU principles of fairness and transparency. This sort of systematic disregard for the rules of fair play undermines the credibility of our own value-based, free-market economy.

The EU's weakness extends beyond economic and commercial relations and into the political sphere. Russia's Council of Europe membership is a case in point. In 1996, Russia was accepted as a member only after lengthy debate and in return for a long list of democratic commitments which were to be met in the shortest possible time. The decision was purely political: The majority concluded that Russia was "better in than out." The justification was that membership would speed up Russia's democratic transformation. Sadly, the opposite is true.

So where do we go to from here? An intriguing analysis by Mexican political scientist Fredo Arias King compares Russia to a person with the psychological condition known as borderline personality disorder. This involves a split cultural identity, unstable self image, black-and-white thinking and difficulties of perceiving one's own responsibilities. Sufferers often have bursts of anger and aggressiveness and attempts to appease and indulge them are counterproductive. The way to handle them, it is said, is to be stable, polite and firm, defining non-negotiable rules that are then stuck to.

Applied to Russia-EU relations, this formula could be the best remedy. The EU should set clear rules that are not subject to change as a result of whim or exceptional circumstances. They must be based on the international standards for the rule of law. Europe's working relationship with Moscow should start afresh on the basis of friendly -- but firm -- reciprocity.

The mission of a united Europe should be to speak the truth, set boundaries and underline that our Western principles and values are not up for negotiation. Such a common and unwavering EU policy would help Russia to differentiate between normal national interests and imperial ambitions, eventually resulting in a Russia that is less unpredictable and more cooperative.

Russia is not a mystery. When people quote Churchill's celebrated 1939 remark, "It [Russia] is a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma," they unfortunately leave out the phrase's essential continuation: "but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."

Tunne Kelam, an Estonian member of the European Parliament, is part of the delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. This comment will be published in the spring issue of Europe's World (www.europesworld.org).

The dangers of 'business as usual' with Russia

2008-12-02

EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - With EU-Russia talks now resuming, it appears that the European Union's Council and the European Commission are not willing or prepared to draw long term conclusions from Russia's large-scale use of military force against a sovereign neighbouring state.

As EU high representative Javier Solana declared: "Although we are at a critical juncture with Russia, there is no alternative to a strong relationship. We need Russia as much as Russia needs the EU and that is why contacts are ongoing."

At the same time, Russia's military invasion and occupation of large parts of Georgia presents a conscious challenge to the fundamental principles upon which international relations and security have been based. This challenge has apparently not been addressed by the EU leading institutions with all seriousness.

While the EU, led by the French presidency, should be commended for its rapid reaction to the Georgian crisis and its effective mediation of ending the hostilities, Europe's current position looks alarmingly ambivalent.

The crucial point is that the EU's approach to the aftermath of the invasion of Georgia has not been credibly balanced between what Javier Solana called the rational and the principle component.

With values and principles left at the level of declarations and their full implementation referred to future conferences, the rational arguments exercise heavy pressure on the practical level of interdependence. This means that while EU leaders declare there is no business as usual, in reality business as usual continues because "there is no alternative".

The Nice summit confirmed the latter approach. While President Sarkozy thanked the Russian counterpart for his willingness to participate and advanced the need for further consolidation and unity, President Dmitri Medvedev pointed out that there was, in fact, no reason at all for suspension of talks as "Russia has never taken unilateral decisions." All had just been "reaction to the steps taken by certain European countries."

And while the EU Presidency declared his commitment to the Georgian territorial integrity, Mr Medvedev offered a truly Orwellian answer: "Russia recognises absolutely the territorial integrity of Georgia, taking into consideration South Ossetia and Abkhazia as subjects of international law".

Russian nationalism

Looking aside from these blatant moral and political contradictions will be a risky and short-sighted policy by which the EU will deprive itself of respect as a serious and independent actor in international affairs - an ambition the EU has officially proclaimed.

Furthermore, EU hesitancy to set clear limits to such a pre-planned violation of the norms of international conduct will in all likelihood encourage future assertiveness of revanchist Russian nationalism.

There remains a basic question to be answered: What is the reason to assume that both strategic partners are sharing the same goals, not to speak of the same values?

In his memoirs, former external relations commissioner Chris Patten speaks of a fundamental difference - while Europe wants stable, well-off neighbours, Russia does not.

Mr Patten writes: "Russia wants weak neighbours and a sphere of influence inhabited by dependent supplicants". Since August 2008, the latter approach is being demonstrated not just by declarations and diplomacy but by military actions.

The effect of the EU's feebleness in handling Russia is as bad for Russia as it is for us.

In the last century, the Western democracies' desperate attempts to cling to the continuation of a strong relationship with Adolf Hitler failed. Indeed, the paradigm of international security is not the same after 8 August, 2008. The longer the formally united but internally disunited Europe hesitates to demonstrate that the unilateral change of this paradigm will have serious consequences, the higher the price to be paid for continuing business as usual.

There is still a chance to avoid paying this price. Chris Patten points out that the arrival in the EU of "former Soviet satrapies ... firmed up our policy. An ounce of their experience was worth several tonnes of humbug from Paris, London, Berlin and Rome."

In the new situation, taking use of this resource is more expedient than ever.

Tunne Kelam is an Estonian MEP and member of the EU-Russia parliamentary co-operation committee.

AGRA FOCUS interview with Helir-Valdor Seeder

2008-11-15

This month's Interview on the future of EU farm policy is with the Estonian Farm Minister Helir-Valdor Seeder. As probably the most liberal of all of the New Member States in its attitude to public agriculture policy, Estonia is not representative of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 (or 2007) - other than in its call for uniform aid across the EU based on area, rather than on historic receipts - but Seeder's contribution to last month's Informal Council debate in Annecy on the future of the CAP underlined that the government in Tallinn is about the only NMS government with a clear and concrete for how policy should evolve. Read more

Business as usual?

2008-11-05

Europe really has a very short memory. After the Russian aggression against Georgia on Aug. 8, 2008, European leaders stood up and promised to make it absolutely clear to Russia that such behavior could not be tolerated in Europe. To demonstrate that they were serious with this message, Europe decided to cancel - or postpone as it was officially said - the negotiations with Moscow on a new "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement." Europe insisted that Russia must obey a six-point ceasefire deal, which ended the Georgia war on Aug 12, before any talks on the partnership agreement can start again. The restart of negotiations depended on Russian compliance with those commitments that it made in August.

Unfortunately the Russia has not done this. It has actually broken most of points of the ceasefire deal by failing by example to withdraw its forces to their pre-war positions. Russian troops have left most of the so called buffer-zone, but are still occupying parts of territories controlled by Georgia till the start of the military conflict. European observers are not having access to the territories of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a result of this the provocations, bombings and conflicts are continuing in the border area. Russia is having significantly more troops on the territory as before the conflict.

Some European leaders have nevertheless decided to close their eyes to all this. They say that Russia is doing everything it's supposed to do, so it is time to restart the negotiations. This would amount to a return to "business as usual" and sends a signal that Russia had escaped any lasting diplomatic penalty for invading Georgia. Such of decision would show Russia that aggression pays off; that Europe is incapable of holding a firm line against aggression and that Russia's neighbors cannot rely on the EU to protect them from Russian bullying. Even as Moscow has declared that it is actually "not so interested" on these negotiations, the restart of the talks would be an important symbol. Russia would claim a victory if they started, getting signal: "We did it!"

This is very bad message not only for Europe but for Russia itself. The war with Georgia has been for Russia both geopolitically and economically very costly. Economist Andrey Illarionov, a former adviser to Vladimir Putin and now an outspoken critic of the Russian authorities, has described the conflict with Georgia as a "geopolitical catastrophe for Russia" since it destroyed the delicate geopolitical balance that Russia established in the South Caucasus over two centuries in alliance with Georgia. It turned Russia also to the conflict with CIS members and Asian countries. Collapse of the Russian stocks after the invasion was dramatic, helping Russia to become "worst performer" during world-wide economic crises. "Victory" over small Georgia has helped Putin to bolster support to its totalitarian policies inside of Russia. When West now accepts such behavior and returns to "business as usual" the democratic forces, protesting against the invasion, would get another hit.

These are reasons why Poland, Baltic and most of Nordic countries with Great Britain have opposed the proposal to restart negotiations with Russia. How long they can resist the pressure of "old Europe" will be seen. In this moment it is nevertheless necessary to look back to the history, which teaches us that appeasement of aggressor never pays off.

Estonia's Investment Frontier

2008-10-01

Words: Juhan Parts, Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications of Estonia

Walking down the streets of Tallinn is like seeing a modern medieval age. Strolling through old Tallinn, the stone streets feel slightly uneven below you as you navigate through a throng of tourists. Passing by a cafe you notice a businessman typing away at a laptop while sipping a latte. High castle walls tower over you like stone giants while colorful garments, displayed in nooks along the street, beckon you. The flavors of restaurants dance through the air and wet your appetite. Cell phone chatter, the calls of street vendors, and the chirping of birds fill the air with life. Turning a corner, you stumble upon a gallery of fresh flowers, vibrant with color and intoxicating with fragrance. This is Tallinn, the cultural capital of Europe for 2011.

Still shrouded by the history of the Soviet occupation, Estonia's revolutionary transformation is relatively unknown but significant. Over the last 17 years of independence, Estonia has gone from an economically stressed Soviet republic to an emerging high-tech and financial
center of the wider Baltic Sea Region.With a population of 1.4 million people, Estonia is a small but dynamic community. Situated as the center of the Baltic Sea Region, Estonia is an access point to 93 million sophisticated customers - the most dynamic market in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia to Russia to Poland to Germany.While being in a pivotal position regionally, Estonia attracts around three million foreign tourists per year, which is considerable considering its population size.

Like many other countries, Estonia boasts itself as an oasis for foreign investment. Unlike many other countries, Estonia is more walk than talk and able to demonstrate many necessary qualities for this claim. Recently ranked by Forbes as the number 10 country to do business,
Estonia is clearly a focal point in the Baltic Sea Region.With high rankings in economic freedoms (#12 by the Heritage Foundation), world competitiveness (#23 by IMD), and network readiness (#10 by the NRI institute), Estonia is outpacing its Baltic neighbors in both growth and potential.

The Estonian success story is based on a firm political commitment to stable and liberal economic policies. Some simple but important facets of our macroeconomic policy include: a fixed exchange rate system, balanced budget of the central government, unrestricted free movement of capital, a simple tax system, and liberal trade and price policy. These basic tenants create the positive investment climate that so many countries strive to achieve but rarely can. The success in Estonia can be partly attributed to our small, but efficient and determined population.

There are many reasons why Estonia is well regarded. The foreign investment code is transparent and treats all investments equally, whether foreign or domestic. Opening new businesses is easy and clearly defined, fastest time being 9 minutes and 25 seconds when application was filed online. Partly due to our ICT investments, Tallinn was named one of the top seven most intelligent regions of the world by the Intelligent Community Forum for the second consecutive year in 2008.

Logistics in Estonia are well developed. Our ice-free port allows for the continuous movement of goods by ship. Container traffic going through Estonian ports is growing steadily towards creating a regional hub, especially with direct container ship lines to coastal China being planned. A highly developed logistics system enables Estonia to host companies that are part of global supply chains, taking advantage of the global division of labor. We are good at working on more complicated phases of production, which need speed and proximity to the market. The past focus for Estonian manufacturing was based on putting together products from imported goods, such as cell phones by Elcoteq. This is shifting toward more advanced and skilled manufacturing as Estonia is more competitive on fulfilling smaller, high quality and just-in-time orders than on simple operations requiring only cheap labor. Manufacturing saw significant growth in 2007 with 24 percent growth in apparatus industry and 19 percent growth in machinery and metal processing.

Now, Estonia's relatively inexpensive labor compared to the rest of Europe (€10.000 avg. per year in Estonia vs. €30.000 avg. per year in Germany) and ability to produce more advanced and complicated goods is a foundation for great growth. The high quality of Estonian labor is based on a competitive education system producing results that ranked Estonian schoolchildren as 5th highest in sciences in the world by a PISA study in 2006.

Estonia is a highly digitized and modern country. It is a place where cell phones can buy lunch or purchase parking. The government has adopted online voting on local and national elections and over 90 percent of bank transactions occur over the Internet. Interaction with the government is very easy with this focus; over 80% of citizens file taxes online. Innovations such as Kazaa and Skype can claim Estonia as their birthplace.

As a demonstration of how important e-business is to Estonia, one only needs to look at the cyber attacks on Estonia that occurred in April and May of 2007. Estonia successfully thwarted an all out attack on Estonia's cyber-infrastructure. This attack which targeted Estonian government, banking, and media websites was the first of its kind. One result of this event was the creation of NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which is situated in Tallinn. Also, cyber security is rapidly emerging in Estonia as a new IT sector, with companies like GuardTime creating internet security solutions.

One advantage of Estonia's small size is its ability to act as a test market for new products. Estonians are very open to new ideas and technologies. Entering into the rest of the region and Europe is very easy from Estonia as well. Although Estonia is an energy-independent country, alternative energy sources are constantly considered. We aim at working out new technologies to make our oil shale based energy production cleaner while increasing the share of renewable energy is also a firm priority. In order to help support new markets, the government has specific R&D grants for technology programs in sectors like ICT, biotech, and energy technology.

After a few years of double digit GDP growth, Estonia is facing a cool-down due to the global economic downturn and the end of the domestic boom. Yet, it is now a great time to invest in the next expansion and positive business cycle of Estonia. Along with our recent growth, EU funds are also available to make this transition the next growth cycle much smoother. The increased specialization of sectors only expands the opportunities for investors to choose areas that most suit them.

The Estonian people are experts in adapting to new conditions. From the Soviet era, to the tumultuous 90's, to the tech-oriented situation today, Estonians are always adapting and reinventing themselves. While going through a new phase in transformation, Estonia is poised to enter a second blooming. This time, dominated by our IT and manufacturing sector. There is no better time than now to take part in this opportunity and reap the rewards that will come. See what we have to offer and don't wonder what could have been.

Otto Tief's government: Independence, 47 years in the making

2008-09-25

On Sept. 18, 1944, the last legal prime minister of the Republic of Estonia, Juri Uluots, acting president, summoned Otto Tief and said, "It is time! The Germans are withdrawing from Estonia. Summon the members of the government and get to work." It was time, indeed. The German forces were leaving Estonia, the front at Emajogi River had been broken, and the Red Army could have reached Tallinn at any moment. Just like in 1918, the moment in which those who are small in number proclaim their will had to be taken advantage of in the battle between two great powers.

The preparations for the government of the republic had been made long ago - in fact, this was the objective of national resistance from the very beginning. If at some moments, the hope was cherished that the government to be created could manage to hold power in its grasp for a longer period, then it was clear in September 1944 that Estonia had been left alone, and the government would be short-lived. Nevertheless, for the future of Estonia, it was regarded as decisively important whether in this war too, the Republic of Estonia would manage to confirm its continuation and its will to stand for the independence of Estonia, instead of bowing to the Nazi or Communist terror.

As the composition of the government had already been agreed upon in August, it did not take much time to form it. The government included J. Holberg (later still left out of the government), R. Penno, H. Partelpoeg, J. Klesment, H. Maandi, A. Susi, A. Rei, O. Gustavson, J. Pikkov, E. Inglis, J. Kaarlimae and V. Sumberg. Colonel J. Maide was appointed commander-in-chief of the armies.

At a government meeting on Sept. 19, in the Eesti Maapank building at Sakala Street, Tief announced the assumption of office of the new government. Troops known as the Pitka boys, led by Adm. J. Pitka, assumed authority in several parts of the city, preventing the Germans from blowing up strategic objects. The 2nd battalion of the Finnish boys, brought in front of Tallinn for defense, prevented the Germans from attacking the plants in Maardu, engaging in a skirmish with the German units that were sent to "call them to order." In the afternoon of Sept. 20, a blue, black and white flag was hoisted atop the Pikk Hermann Tower. This enthralled the people but angered the Germans. In the city, conflicts arose between the Estonian and German soldiers.

Soon, the Germans withdrew to the port and devoted their attention to the evacuation of their units.
Regardless of the rise in spirits that accompanied the hoisting of the blue, black and white flag, the situation was hopeless. At the government meeting held on the evening of Sept. 20, Tief announced that the government would begin performing its duties. Tief regarded it important to print and distribute an issue of the State Gazette with the composition of the government and the declaration, thus making the formation of the government legal. At the same time, Tief found that since the government did not have the power to protect Tallinn, he would have to leave Estonia to continue the fight for Estonian freedom abroad.

The assumption of office of the government of the republic was also declared on the radio, and foreign countries were informed. With that, the government had achieved its goal. Some of the modern Russian historians have found that it was "too little." Such an attitude is all the more cynical in that without the intervention of the tanks of the Red Army, the government would have lasted a lot longer. Tief's government would have been able to cope with the German forces; it was the Red Army invading the country that brought an end to its activities. It must be remembered that in February 1918, the activity of the Rescue Committee was not much more comprehensive, but it was enough to establish a foundation for the independence of Estonia.

Aleksandr Djukov, who has examined the activities of Tief's government in more detail, presents some clear falsifications in his approach (Velikaja Obolgannaja voina - 2. Moscow 2008, pp. 269-276, which, however, are not hard to expose. To show that it was an institution established by the German occupation forces and following the orders thereof, Djukov states, for example, that Tief's government was formed on Aug. 18, not Sept. 18, 1944. Second, Djukov declares that Tallinn was "liberated" in battles with the German units who had lost up to 600 men who fell here. Actually, the Red Army did not have any contact in the form of battle with the German units in Tallinn; on Sept. 22-23, the Red Army was faced by Estonian units around Tallinn. Djukov also ignores the evidence of the conflicts between the Estonian and German soldiers.

On Sept. 21, most of the members of Tief's government left Tallinn. Only Tief, along with a few closer colleagues, remained, and then left the city the next morning, right before the arrival of the tank units of the Red Army. The Red Army occupied Tallinn without much resistance and replaced the blue, black and white atop the Pikk Hermann Tower with the red flag - a fact that Djukov still ignores, regardless of numerous testimonies. According to Djukov, the Estonian flag was waving atop the tower along with the German flag - so it was indeed hoisted on the morning of Sept. 21, but not on Sept. 22.

Djukov does not write anything about the resistance to the Red Army of the soldiers under Tief, either. At Nomme, Paaskula, Keila, Harudevahe, Kose, Kumna intersection, Risti and Marjamaa, the Estonian soldiers fighting under the blue, black and white flag put up the last resistance to the Soviets, allowing tens of thousands of refugees to escape from their grasp. During the following months, the Soviet security units arrested most of the members of the government and closer colleagues. Some of them were executed, but most were sent to the prison camps in Siberia for a longer period. Today, the Russian public prosecutor's office still refuses to rehabilitate the members of Tief's government.

In 1918, it took nine months from the declaration of independence to the actual enforcement. This time, it took 47 years: the moment arrived in 1991. It would hardly have gone that way if, in 1944, there had not been men who, in spite of the hopeless situation, did something simple and clear for the Estonian state: performed their duty. This is the history that we have no reason to be ashamed of. This is the history that we have to tell the world. Because if we do not, no one will.

From Russia with love: beware of accepting strange gifts

2008-09-25

German Trojan horses are dangerously increasing the EU's dependence on Russian energy.

According to the myth, the Trojans "joyfully dragged" the wooden horse left by Odysseus into Troy, believing the ten-year siege was finally over. Some warned them not to. In vain.

In its 2007 report on EU-Russia relations, the European Council on Foreign Relations refers to this episode, flatly stating that Greece and Cyprus represent Russian interests in Europe. Cyprus, it noted, is officially the biggest investor in Russia, since its banks launder so much Russian money.

In the nearly 18 years since Europe joyfully embraced the end of communism, several other Trojan horses have emerged. The most insidious are the politicians increasing the EU's dependence on Russian energy.

Russian energy is now an essential part of Moscow's armoury, as shown in its strategic blockades against Ukraine and Georgia, the years of "repairs" to the Lithuanian gas pipeline and the repairs to the pipeline to Georgia ahead of this month's extraordinary EU summit on Russia.

But the most blatant Trojan horse is the ever-smiling Gerhard Schröder, the former German chancellor and now the chair of the Nord Stream gas pipeline consortium, which for no operational reason will at huge cost - not least to the environment - bypass the Baltic states and Poland, as well as Belarus and Ukraine.

The deal was signed days before Schröder was ousted in elections in September 2005 and, just before he stepped down, his outgoing government guaranteed €1 billion of the pipeline's construction costs. Then Schröder took Gazprom's shilling, a move that provoked Tom Lantos, chairman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to call him a "political prostitute". Harsher things have been said of him since, but not harsh enough to discourage him from continuing the seven years of pro-Russian cheerleading that characterised his chancellorship.

On Georgia he has also been helpful. It was hardly a surprise, he remarked, that Russia reacted to being encircled by the West. "We shouldn't confuse things," he added. "The starting point of the military confrontation was Georgia's march into South Ossetia."

Nord Stream's managing director is Matthias Warnig, a former Stasi officer and intimate since the 1980s with another Dresden secret-service figure: ex-KGB agent Vladimir Putin. Like Schröder, Warnig is reportedly a regular at Putin's birthday parties.

Soon, there may be the perfect Trojan triumvirate. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, for years Schröder's right-hand man and now Germany's foreign minister, was last week chosen as the Social Democrat candidate for chancellor in 2009.

Even if Steinmeier loses, Russia has locked many German politicians into personal and business relationships that are hard to unpick. (That is true even of deeply conservative Bavaria and its former leader Edmund Stoiber: the Bavaria-based chemicals giant BASF, which is close to Stoiber's party, is part of the Nord Stream consortium, with long-term gas contracts with Gazprom.)

"What is good for Russia is good for Germany," Warnig said in an interview published on Nord Stream's website. It was an odd comment - unless he takes a 1939 view of Molotov's and Ribbentrop's pact - but it was also wrong. The West is so hungry for profits, Lenin once noted, "that they will sell us the rope to hang them with."

Mart Laar was prime minister of Estonia from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2002.

The balance of power

2008-09-15

The Energy and Climate Package would challenge several current principles in the energy market and would also drive member states to reconsider national energy strategies.

The issue of electricity imports from third countries in the context of the planned emission trading system is currently particularly significant in the Baltic region, but is also as topical in all member states of the EU neighbouring with non-EEA countries.

It is vital to find solutions to all concerns of the member states; Estonia sees that the parties can come to an agreement on the way forward. The Commission and also Slovenian and French Presidencies have made impressive efforts to move towards a solution in the process of development of the energy and climate package.

Estonia is especially concerned of potential effects of the energy and climate package on the Baltic power market. At present, Baltic countries have already got extremely strong interconnections, which could supply over 80 % of total need of electricity into Baltic market area.

The importing of electricity produced outside the European Union can significantly influence the electricity industry in the Baltic countries. At the same time, there are only very limited interconnections between the Baltic market and the rest of the European Union electricity market.

Considering the needs for energy security and security of supply, it would be unacceptable to make electricity supply dependent on extensive electricity imports from third countries.

So, how to avoid the EU companies' motivation to transfer their production into third party countries? Estonia strongly believes that unfair competition should be avoided in the internal market of the EU. If from 2013, the European Union electricity producers have to start to buy their entire CO2 quota from auctions but third country producers are not be obliged to do the same, the third countries' power producers would have an unfair competitive advantage. Thus, to prevent market failure and support fair competition in the European Union energy market, electricity import has to be part of the emission trading system.

The first reason for electricity import regulation is to champion the cause of fighting against climate change.

Currently, drafted regulations could lead to a situation where a neighbouring non-EU state creates an unknown amount of greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production that is sold to the internal market. This could also motivate EU companies to transfer their production into third party countries, which would increase carbon leakage.

Market distortions

The second reason for creating a demand for electricity import control is market distortion.

Electricity produced in third countries under lower environmental requirements is likely to be cheaper compared to electricity produced in the internal market. Producers that are obliged to meet environmental requirements and EU climate policy can not compete on equal grounds with those who have no such obligations. It would be unfair to give third country producers with lower environmental and production quality standards an advantage over producers within the internal market.

The third reason for import regulation is the potential danger to national security. Energy issues today have to be considered in accord with security as far as some third countries are using energy supplies again as a measure for political influence. The energy and climate package should not degrade the conditions for investing into electricity production facilities inside the internal market. Estonia would like to see a balance between consumption and production capacity within the internal market of the EU.

Estonia has made a proposal that also the electricity importers would also be required to obtain CO2 allocation from the EU market equal to the amount that would be emitted from a coal plant to produce this electricity. This would create an equal grounding for the same power producers and would remove a major part of the unfair competition.

Currently, there is no common regulation in the EU on how to approach the issues of electricity imports from third countries.

Liberalisation of power markets and emission trading schemes have made it very attractive for the third countries' power producers to enter these markets with their power supplies and have made it difficult for member states to apply any measures against such imports.

Estonia hopes to co-operate in this topic and is looking forward to reaching an agreement on the energy and climate package by the end of the French Presidency.

Estonia is also concerned about state aid and auctioning rules. Potential state aid for using indigenous fuels is limited in the Electricity Directive to 15% of the electricity production of a member state. If, for national security reasons, a member state would be interested in supporting its local power production, then, in some cases, the need for support in the light of the climate package could be even higher.

Revising the principles of limitations to state aid in the Electricity Directive could also solve the issue of free allocations for a power sector for majority of the member states.

There are several concerns also from the member states that any kind of manipulation with auctions should be avoided. As long as not all member states have auctioning rules on the table, it will be extremely difficult to say that these threats are minimised. Therefore, the commission and presidency should draft detailed rules for the auctions that would address all of the issues raised by the different member states.

Russland ausschließen! / The Council of Europe Must Act

2008-09-15

Please find the original English version below.

Trotz einer fragilen Demokratie und Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Nordkaukasus trat Russland dem Europarat 1996 dessen ungeachtet bei. Das Beitrittsdokument verwies zwar besonders auf die Situation in Tschetschenien und forderte die Russische Föderation auf, nach einer friedlichen Lösung des Konflikts zu suchen. Seine Versprechen in Bezug auf Tschetschenien hat Russland aber nie eingelöst. Stattdessen entschied es sich 1999 für einen zweiten blutigen Krieg in Tschetschenien, was im Jahr 2000 die Aussetzung seiner Stimmrechte in der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates zur Folge hatte. Aber selbst diese schwache Sanktion wurde schon nach sechs Monaten aufgehoben, lange bevor der Krieg, der letzten Endes 150 000 Zivilisten das Leben kostete, abgeflaut war.

Natürlich registrierte Moskau den ängstlichen Umgang des Europarates mit der Situation in Tschetschenien. Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte des Rates wurde nun ein Mitgliedsstaat unter fadenscheinigem Vorwand von einem anderen Mitgliedsstaat angegriffen, auseinandergerissen und besetzt.

Georgien ist sicherlich nicht schuldlos an der Situation. Aber die Schuld gleichermaßen auf beide Schultern, die des Aggressors und des Angegriffenen, zu verteilen ist scheinheilig. Schlimmer noch, es besteht die Gefahr, dass der Europarat seiner Grundidee beraubt wird. Russland, in einer Art Siegesrausch, droht jetzt der Ukraine, Moldawien, Aserbaidschan, Polen und den baltischen Staaten. Ein stummer Europarat, der sich nicht zu diesen Provokationen äußert, würde Russland in seiner Sicht bestätigen, dass Europas älteste Menschenrechtsorganisation eine zahnlose Institution ist und dass es ganz nach Belieben handeln kann.

Die Mitgliedschaft Russlands mag in der Vergangenheit, als noch ein gewisser politischer Pluralismus vorhanden war, sinnvoll gewesen sein. Aber diese Zeit ist längst vorbei. Die Situation hat sich grundlegend geändert. Russland hat zur Genüge seine Verachtung für den Europarat und alles, wofür er steht, bewiesen. Es gefällt sich als Sieger. Es fordert uns durch sein Verhalten heraus, endlich etwas gegen seine ablehnende Haltung gegenüber den europäischen Werten zu tun, denen es sich damals durch Beitritt in den Europarat verschrieben hat.

Russland hat sich für seinen Weg entschieden. Es ist ein gefährlicher Weg und sicherlich nicht der von Europa! Es ist an der Zeit, Russland aus dem Europarat auszuschließen.

Andres Herkel ist Berichterstatter der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates, Mart Laar war Ministerpräsident Estlands.

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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MUST ACT

by

Andres Herkel, Head of the Estonian delegation in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly
Mart Laar, Former Prime Minister of Estonia

Of the many ways in which Russia is exceptional, its membership of Europe's premier human rights body, the Council of Europe, is perhaps the most embarrassing. Countries are usually admitted into the club only once they fulfill numerous pledges, including a commitment to an open democracy, the protection of human and minority rights, guarantee of free speech, and so on. It is on this basis that Belarus and Kazakhstan, for example, have not yet been accepted.

Yet Russia joined early in1996, despite a fragile democracy and widespread human-rights abuses in the North Caucasus. Its accession document drew special attention to Chechnya, encouraging the Russian Federation to seek a peaceful solution there.

Unlike other members, Russia was granted membership in Europe's oldest pro-democracy and human rights organization before fulfilling the main criteria for membership.

Russia never fulfilled its Chechnya commitments. Instead, it opted for a second murderous war in 1999. Its voting rights in the Council's Parliamentary Assembly were duly suspended in 2000. But even that mild sanction was lifted six months later, long before the war - which ultimately killed about 150,000 civilians - subsided.

At any given time, a number of countries are under close monitoring to ensure they respect their commitments to the Council of Europe (the list currently includes Ukraine, Georgia, Albania and Armenia). Yet, despite a dramatic degradation in its track record, the monitoring of Russia in effect appeared to stop in 2005, when the last report concerning its performance was published. Russia has only been investigated in three reports during its 12 years of membership. Armenia and Azerbaijan, both members for six years, have already been subjected to eight reports each.

Russian cases are flooding the European Court on Human Rights, the Council's main adjudication tool. And Russia is doing its utmost to ignore and cripple the court. The first rulings regarding Chechnya, made in 2006, were simply ignored; and the reforms needed to help the Court cope with a drastically increased workload are being blocked.

The Council's timid handling of the Chechen situation, mostly ignored in the West, was duly noted in Moscow. The permissive message it sent to Moscow was reinforced by the Council's handling of increasing Russian provocations against Georgia. Russian passports were illegally distributed in the ethnically cleansed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 2004. In 2006, an economic blockade was complemented by pogroms against Georgians in Russia. In 2007, a Russian fighter dropped a missile onto a Georgian radar station. Earlier this year, the provocations mounted: Russia absorbed the territories into its legal space, regularly violated Georgian airspace, deployed offensive troops in Abkhazia and shot down at least one Georgian police drone.
Throughout, the Council stayed silent.

And now, for the first time in the Council's history, a member state has invaded, dismembered and occupied a fellow member state on the flimsiest of pretexts.

Georgia was not blameless. Its young leadership lacked experience and made mistakes, and its democracy is not up to Swedish standards. But trying to share the blame equally between invader and victim reeks of the crassest hypocrisy. Worse, it threatens to empty the very idea of the Council of Europe of any meaning. Russia, drunk on its "victory", is threatening the Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Poland and the Baltic States. A silent Council would merely confirm its view that Europe's oldest human rights institution is toothless, and that it can in fact do as it pleases.

For a number of reasons, many Western countries chose to ignore the ominous developments in Russia. Energy dependence plays a role, but by no means the only one: many of our colleagues genuinely believed that oil wealth, the need for western expertise and so on would positively influence the country and its leadership. That hope, shaken by the wars in Chechnya, the murders of Anna Politkovskaya and other critics, the muffling of the opposition, the control of the media by the state and the praising of Stalin's "achievements" in official textbooks, has been shattered in the mountains of Georgia.

And yet some prominent commentators refuse to accept this new, and decidedly unpleasant, reality. For them, Russia's grievances excuse all. The pesky little countries of its borderlands should not have sought refuge in the havens of NATO and the EU. The democratic wishes of their people count for little: they should be resigned to bed down with the Russian bear. Moreover, these aspirations were supported by America - surely enough of an indictment. And anyway, the West needs Russia's energy, so we have little choice but to accept Russia's land grab in the Caucasus.

This cold realism, which offers so little comfort to the countries on Russia's rim, has no place in the Council of Europe. This is not an organization devoted to pipelines and business, but to values which Europe takes seriously: democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the rejection of force as a tool to settle disputes.

Russian membership may have made some sense in the early days, when there was still some political pluralism. A few independent politicians, such as Sergey Kovalev, the eminent human rights activist, represented the country in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly.

But that time is long past. The situation has fundamentally changed. Russia has demonstrated its contempt for the Council and all it stands for. It smirks in its victory. And it challenges us to do anything about its rejection of the European values to which it once subscribed.

Russia has chosen its path. It is a dangerous one, and it is not Europe's. It is past time to suspend it from the Council of Europe.

Le néo-impérialisme russe plane sur l’Europe / The Russian neo imperialism glides on Europe

2008-09-12

The article is co-written by the Chairmen of the European Union Affaires Committees of the Seimas of Lithuania, Riigikogu of Estonia and Saeima of Latvia - Andrius Kubilius, Marko Mihkelson and Vaira Paegle. Please find the original English version below.

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Andrius Kubilius président du comité sur les affaires européennes au Seimas (1) de Lituanie, Marko Mihkelson président du comité sur les affaires européennes au Riigikogu (1) d'Estonie et Vaira Paegle présidente du comité sur les affaires européennes à la Saeima (1) de Lettonie.

C'est à la suite de l'invasion combinée soviéto-nazie de la Pologne, en octobre 1939, que Winston Churchill fit cette saillie décrivant la Russie, depuis restée dans les annales : «Une devinette enveloppée dans un mystère à l'intérieur d'une énigme.» Ce qui a pu être vrai au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale a cessé de l'être avec la défaite du nazisme, lorsque le dessein de Staline pour l'Europe devint douloureusement clair et que les pays d'Europe de l'Est ont vu, l'un après l'autre, leur indépendance et leur démocratie succomber à la tyrannie soviétique. Churchill lui-même fut l'un des premiers à le comprendre, lorsque, en 1946, il invoqua la métaphore du «rideau de fer» pour décrire la division de l'Europe par la force. Aujourd'hui, certains se prétendent toujours perplexes face à l'attitude de la Russie et encouragent l'Europe à faire preuve de patience dans ses échanges avec Moscou. En fait, il n'y a rien de mystérieux dans l'attaque militaire brutale de la Russie en Géorgie, et rien ne peut justifier que l'on continue d'ignorer les véritables intentions de la Russie en Europe de l'Est. La posture nationaliste du Kremlin présente une menace réelle pour nos valeurs européennes.

Dans le contexte de l'histoire troublée de l'Europe, le système institutionnel européen moderne est une réussite extraordinaire. Après des siècles d'autocratie, de rivalité et de guerres, nous avons uni la majeure partie de notre continent dans la paix, la prospérité et la démocratie. L'Union européenne est la pièce maîtresse de ce système qui compte aussi le Conseil de l'Europe et l'Otan. Ces organisations sont à la fois l'expression et le garant de nos valeurs européennes essentielles qui incluent, le respect de l'Etat de droit, le rejet de la guerre comme instrument de politique entre leurs membres et le droit à l'autodétermination démocratique pour chaque nation en Europe.

Ce grand accomplissement historique fait désormais face à une provocation sérieuse et directe de la part d'un pays déterminé à réintroduire les techniques mêmes d'intrigues de pouvoir que nous avons cherché à bannir. Vladimir Poutine et l'élite russe au pouvoir ne partagent aucun de nos principes fondamentaux. Pour cette élite, la société ouverte et notre adhésion pleine et entière à la démocratie sont autant de signes de décadence et de faiblesse. Cette élite rejette aussi l'idée que les relations entre Etats puissent être arbitrées pacifiquement dans le cadre de la loi, plutôt que par le pouvoir et la coercition. Elle rejette le principe d'égalité souveraine entre Etats et cherche à le remplacer par un ordre néo-impérialiste reconnaissant la prééminence de la Russie au sein d'une sphère d'influence reconstituée.

Beaucoup d'Européens comprennent cette situation mais se confortent dans l'idée que les ambitions de la Russie sont limitées à son voisinage immédiat ; principalement les anciens pays soviétiques que sont la Géorgie et l'Ukraine. Or, toute analyse sérieuse du comportement russe au cours des dernières années démontre que le Kremlin aspire à créer une sphère d'influence s'étendant bien au-delà de ses pays frontaliers pour inclure ceux qui font déjà partie de l'UE et de l'Otan. Parmi les exemples de cette intimidation économique et diplomatique déployée contre d'autres pays, nous connaissons ceux de la Géorgie et de l'Ukraine, mais les mêmes techniques de coercition ont été utilisées contre un groupe plus vaste de pays européens ayant eu la témérité de défier Moscou.

La Lituanie subit un embargo pétrolier depuis deux ans parce qu'elle refuse de vendre sa raffinerie de pétrole Mazeikiu Nafta à une entreprise russe. L'Estonie a fait l'expérience d'une campagne concertée de cyberterrorisme après avoir décidé de déplacer un mémorial de guerre soviétique. La Pologne est menacée par des armes nucléaires pour avoir coopéré au projet de défense antimissile américain. Même le Royaume-Uni voit ses investissements énergétiques et ses projets culturels passer dans la ligne de mire sous prétexte qu'il est l'hôte d'une nouvelle génération de dissidents russes - l'un d'entre eux ayant été tué sur le sol britannique.

Cette logique de comportements a pour objectif ultime de désorganiser et de subordonner le système européen lui-même. Les responsables russes sont assez intelligents pour savoir qu'ils ne peuvent construire leur nouvelle sphère d'influence par consentement. Aussi longtemps que l'Union européenne et l'Otan continueront d'attirer les pays frontaliers de la Russie avec la promesse de prospérité, de sécurité et de démocratie, le Kremlin verra son emprise impériale menacée. Il cherche par conséquent à diviser l'Europe en créant des relations de dépendance et de domination - utilisant les approvisionnements énergétiques comme principales armes - de façon à asseoir lui-même sa prééminence.

Le but stratégique du Kremlin n'est rien moins que la finlandisation de tout le continent. La réponse de l'Europe doit être une détermination nouvelle pour achever l'unification démocratique de notre continent. Il est urgent que l'Europe étudie les étapes nécessaires pour désamorcer l'arme énergétique russe et poser les bases d'une relation équilibrée fondée sur le commerce et la diplomatie plutôt que sur la coercition et le contrôle monopolistique. Elle doit réaffirmer sa croyance au droit de toute nation européenne à l'autodétermination démocratique en ouvrant les portes de l'Union européenne et de l'Otan à tous les pays européens qui remplissent les critères nécessaires et qui veulent les rejoindre. Mesurons le risque qu'il y a à se soumettre à l'intimidation et au chantage d'un gouvernement russe résolu à saper nos plus importants accomplissements européens. Plus la logique impériale connaît de succès, plus grand est son appétit de succès. Il y a désormais bien plus en jeu que l'avenir de l'Ossétie du Sud, ou même de la Géorgie.

(1) Assemblée parlementaire.

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In October 1939, following the Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland, Winston Churchill offered his famous description of Russia as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma". What may have been true at the outbreak of the Second World War ceased to be so following the defeat of Nazism as Stalin's design for Europe became painfully clear and the independence and democracy of one Eastern European country after another succumbed to Soviet tyranny. Churchill himself was among the first to realise this in 1946 when he invoked the metaphor of the "iron curtain" to describe the division of Europe by force.

Today there are those who still claim to be puzzled by Russia's behaviour and urge caution and patience in Europe's dealings with Moscow. But there was nothing mysterious or enigmatic about Russia's brutal military attack on Georgia and there can be no excuse for continuing to ignore the reality that its intentions in Eastern Europe are once again aggressive and domineering. There are differences as well as points of comparison with the Cold War era. The Kremlin is no longer the standard bearer of an ideology with pretensions to global supremacy. Russia is also militarily weaker than it was in the days when its tank divisions lined up along the inner-German border. But the Kremlin's nationalistic and chauvinistic posture nevertheless poses a very real menace to our European way of life and it is time we grappled honestly with the implications.

In the context of our history, the modern European state system is an extraordinary achievement. After centuries of autocracy, rivalry and war, we have united most of our continent in peace, prosperity and democracy. We have done this within a network of rules and bodies that protects the rights of all nations while institutionalising cooperation between them. The European Union is the centrepiece of this system, of which the Council of Europe and NATO must also count as vital components. These organisations are both the expression and guarantor of our essential European values, the most important of which include respect for the rule of law, the rejection of war as an instrument of policy between its members and the right of democratic self-determination for every nation in Europe.

The importance of the war against Georgia is that it lays bare what should already have been obvious: that this great historical achievement now faces a serious and direct challenge from a country determined to reintroduce the very techniques of power politics we have consciously sough to banish. Vladimir Putin and the Russian governing elite share none of our assumptions about how the European system ought to be structured. It dismisses our embrace of democracy and the open society as signs of decadence and weakness. It rejects the idea that inter-state relations should be mediated peacefully within a framework of law, rather than by power and coercion. Most significantly, it rejects the principle of sovereign equality and seeks to replace it with a neo-imperial order that recognises Russia's pre-eminence within a reconstituted sphere of influence.

Many Europeans understand this point, but comfort themselves with the idea that Russia's ambitions are limited to its immediate vicinity; mainly the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine. This is a dangerous misreading of the situation. Any serious analysis of Russian behaviour in recent years demonstrates that the Kremlin aspires to a sphere of influence extending well beyond the exposed and institutionally detached countries on its borders to include countries that are already part of the EU and NATO. We are familiar with examples of economic and diplomatic intimidation used against Georgia and Ukraine, but the same techniques of coercion have been used against a much broader range of European countries that have had the temerity to defy Moscow.

Lithuanian has suffered an oil embargo for two years because it refused to sell its Majeikiu Nafta oil refinery to a Russia company. Estonia experienced a concerted Russian campaign of cyber-terrorism after it decided to move a Soviet war memorial. Poland has been threatened with nuclear weapons for cooperating with America's missile defence project. Even the United Kingdom has had energy investments and cultural projects targeted for playing host to a new generation of Russian dissidents, one of whom was murdered on British soil.

These are not isolated incidents, but part of a consistent pattern of behaviour that departs deliberately and aggressively from European norms. The ultimate objective is to disrupt and subordinate the European system itself. Russian leaders are clever enough to know that they cannot build their new sphere of influence by consent. As long as the EU and NATO continue to attract countries along Russia's border with the promise of prosperity, security and democracy, the Kremlin's imperial grip will be threatened. It therefore seeks to divide Europe by creating relationships of dependency and domination - using energy supplies as its main weapons - in order to cement its own primacy. The Kremlin's strategic goal is nothing short of the Finlandisation of the entire continent.

Europe's response must be a blunt rejection of this effort and a renewed determination to complete the democratic unification of our continent. It must urgently consider the steps needed to blunt the Russian energy weapon and create the basis for a balanced relationship based on trade and diplomacy rather coercion and monopolistic control. It must reaffirm its belief in the right of every European nation to democratic self-determination by opening the doors of the EU and NATO to all European countries that meet the criteria and want to join.

Sceptics ask us to consider the risk of provoking further Russian hostility by extending the boundaries of Euro-Atlantic integration in this way. Very well, but let us also consider the risk of submitting to the intimidation and blackmail of a Russian government bent on undermining our most important European achievements. The imperial logic has a momentum of its own and success merely enlarges its appetite for more of the same. There is far more at stake now than the future of South Ossetia, or even Georgia. It is time we awoke to that fact.

Back to Lenin

2008-09-11

There is a small village in Georgia, not far away from the city of Gori, that for centuries was called Akhalgori. After Georgia was occupied by Soviet Russia in 1921, some local activist decided to rename it Leningori. After the restoration of Georgian independence, the local people gave the village back its original name.

Peaceful life continued till Aug. 10 this year. When Georgian troops left South Ossetia, they were followed by Russian armor and soldiers. After the signing of the ceasefire, villagers hoped that the Russian army would leave and they could continue their normal life.

Unfortunately, this did not happen. The Russians declared Akhalgori to be part of the so called security or buffer zone, which was closed to Georgian authorities, thereby allowing the South Ossetian militia free reign to burn and loot Georgian villages. Most people had already escaped Akhalgori, and to those who remained, the Russian military commander gave two orders: First, take Russian passports or leave immediately, and second - the name of village from this moment on will again be Leningori.

So Russia is really returning back to its Leninist ways. In this context we can and must ask, what are Russia's next steps? The author of the bestselling book "The New Cold War" and one of the best experts on modern Russia, Edward Lucas has published his blog an "email from the policy-planning unit in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service HQ" to the Russian president and the prime minister. Lucas is given to such mystifications, and even as he declares that he himself is not author of this "email" and that it was send to him by a friend, it is easy to see Lucas' fingertips on it.

This makes it interesting to read. What, then, is OPK@SVR.RU reporting to VVP@GOV.RU
and DAM@KREMLIN.RU after a succesful operation in Georgia? It asks, where will Russia move next? "Where will the frontier of the Near Abroad be? The Atlantic? The English Channel? The Rhine? The Elbe? The Oder-Neisse? The Vistula?

If we rely on military force, it cannot be the Atlantic. If we act now, we shall be in Riga in hours; Merkel (Angela Mbeki) will say fierce things for public consumption, but will continue to build the pipeline, Sarkozy will negotiate a cease-fire between us and the Latvians, Mr. Obama will say that Russia must be taught a lesson, and the British public will ask where Latvia is. So far, so good. But then what? Logic suggests that we should take Estonia and Lithuania too. But Estonia has strong ties with Finland and Sweden. Estonia is not for them a 'far away country of which they know little,' and they might reckon our move to be a fundamental threat to their security. Victory could be delayed, and delay is dangerous. Even without the Americans, a British fleet in the Baltic, with overt support from Sweden, Finland and Poland, could deny us control of the sea and air, and enable some Estonian strongholds to hold out against us indefinitely."

So Option II is offered, which is targeted at Europe. "It will be largely a propaganda war, and we shall need to run several lines to prevent the issues becoming clear. There is a lot of ignorance and anti-Americanism, and we need to fuel both, the former by a steady stream of misinformation, the latter by trading on the Americans' ability to lose friends and antagonize people, and also by emphasizing their many defects." Europe must be divided, France and Germany offered special relationships with Russia and cut from Anglo-Saxon world. "Once we have Germany on board, we can digest the intervening countries gradually and quietly without the West noticing."

We can laugh at such mystifications, as it is funny to read C.S. Lewis' famous "The screwtape letters." But as in Lewis' book, there is lot of unpleasant truth to this Lucas satire. As Lewis - especially in "Screwtape proposes a toast" - warns the West on moral weakness and relativism which undermines its power, similar weakness can threaten the West now. It is so good to live a comfortable life and not worry about some countries so far away. Why can't they just live in peace with Russia, which is such an important country for Europe? Lenin noted ninety years ago that The West is so hungry for profits that they will sell us the rope to hang them with. Looking at Schreder and other like-minded politicians in the West, we can safely say that Putin is an excellent pupil of Lenin.

Stop that bear

2008-08-18

Though Russia has not yet achieved the main goal of its attack against Georgia - the removal of the democratically elected president and his replacement with somebody who would bring Georgia back under Russian influence - it appears that the fighting is slowly coming to an end. A cease-fire has been signed, though Russia and its allies are ignoring it.

Looking beyond the wreckage of Gori and Tskhinvali to the long-term implications for Europe's relationship with Russia, it is clear that there can be no return to the status quo.

Until Russian tanks rolled across the Caucasus it was common in parts of Europe to put tensions with Moscow down to a series of unfortunate misunderstandings. Warnings from new European Union member states on Russia's growing aggressiveness were not heeded. Prospects for an improvement in relations were talked up with reassuring phrases about "common values," "enhanced dialogue" and "strategic partnership," as if the only thing missing was a bit of diplomatic effort on our part.

For the sake of Europe, we must now dispose of these illusions. This was not an "accidental war," as some prefer to see it. It was the culmination of a deliberate strategy by Russia to undermine the sovereignty and independence of its neighbors and to begin to restore its former sphere of influence by force. It is wishful thinking to imagine that Russia's ambitions are limited to South Ossetia or even Georgia.

The Kremlin's "national greatness" project dictates that the whole of eastern Europe, including countries that are now part of the EU and NATO, should be subservient to the interests of Russia.

Nothing in the Western response to the attack on Georgia will convince Russia's leaders that this objective is beyond them. On the contrary, they are likely to feel emboldened by the experience to go further unless the West grasps what is happening and establishes clear limits.

It is quite wrong to see Russia's behavior as reckless and unpredictable. The ground for this war was carefully prepared over a period of years in which the Kremlin probed and tested the willingness of Western government to resist its encroachments.

It used energy cut-offs to intimidate Ukraine and Lithuania, waged cyberwar against Estonia, imposed trade sanctions on Poland and grabbed foreign energy investments at home.

In Georgia, Russia supported a build-up of separatist armed forces and provoked them to attack Georgia; introduced an aggressive economic blockade against Georgia; tried to undermine Georgia's Western-minded government; launched missiles against Georgian territory, and shot down Georgian reconnaissance planes.

Having failed to encounter a concerted pushback in response to any of these measures, it was inevitable that Russia would resort to hard military power. Russia calculated this step very carefully. Through our inattention and weakness, it is we in the EU who have been reckless.

It is time to face up to some uncomfortable truths about our relationship with Russia. The most important of these is to recognize that the current Russian political elite does not share our most cherished European values. It rejects multiparty democracy, human rights and freedom of speech as the basis of its domestic political system.

More important, it denies sovereign independence, self-determination, the rule of international law, peaceful diplomacy and voluntary integration as the basis of interstate relations. Since these principles form the basis of the modern European state system, we are faced with a fundamental clash of political values.

Russia's determination to reintroduce power politics, including the use of war as an instrument of policy, is a direct threat to the very foundations of the EU. We cannot afford to ignore that any longer.

We cannot reverse that impression and defend our value system effectively with the EU's existing approach to Russia. The selfish and short-sighted bilateralism by which certain European countries have put their own concerns before those of Europe as a whole needs to be replaced by a policy of real solidarity. We need to counter Russia's abusive use of gas and oil supplies by developing a single European energy system with a real external policy.

We should realize that the time is not right to extend the privileges of strategic partnership to the Russians or perhaps even allow them to benefit from accession to the WTO. Instead, we should focus on integrating with those democracies in Eastern Europe that share our values and want to be part of the EU. These measures are necessary for restoring the integrity of a European state system based on democracy and the rule of law.

Unfortunately, the EU's failure to act in a timely fashion means that such tools of "soft power" are no longer sufficient on their own. Russia has reintroduced military force into the equation, so the defense of democratic Europe needs to acquire a harder edge.

It would be sheer folly to conclude that Georgia and Ukraine should now be kept out of NATO. It was precisely the failure of the Bucharest summit to back the promise of membership with real substance that encouraged Russia to believe that it had an opportunity to prevent the inevitable. If we reward Russia's aggression by continuing to keep Georgia and Ukraine in the waiting room, we should not be surprised if the result is more aggression.

No one should be in doubt any longer about what is at stake in our relationship with Russia. This is a moment of danger and choice for Europe. Do we have the willpower to stand up for our way of life and everything we have built, or will we succumb to power politics and autocracy? If we remain paralyzed by indecision, the choice will be made for us.

Mart Laar was the prime minister of Estonia from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2002

Security of Northern European sea borders

2008-08-18

Globalisation makes it impossible to distinguish between internal and external security, as many states depend on the same or similar security factors. The processes inside the European Union bring the economic, political and security-related interests of the Member States into an ever increasing correlation, since the security risks are widely overlapping.

Meanwhile, the security of every Member State is an issue of national sovereignty - from military, economic, ecological as well as demographical point of view. The security of every country is influenced by various domestic factors as well as developments in neighbouring countries and elsewhere.

Foreign security impact on internal security, domestic stability and safety knows no state borders, be they drawn on land, air or sea. Coastal countries are particularly susceptible to the impact of the multitude of activities carried out at their sea borders. If the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean are mainly threatened by international organised crime - terrorism, drug and human trafficking - the sea borders of the Northern European countries are at risk from the deteriorating ecological situation brought on by the intense economic activity.

The ecological situation of the Baltic Sea causes particular concern as it adds pressure to the economy of many countries (drastic decline in fish stocks, negative processes among marine life forms, etc). The key issue of recent years in the Gulf of Finland is the massive increase of petroleum products transit from Russian ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Vyssotsk).

Despite the complex navigational and meteorological conditions (shallow water, difficult ice conditions, frequent storms, limited visibility, etc), oil has long been transported in cheap single-hulled tankers. Frequent leaks and criminal pumping of bilge water from vessels into the sea has repeatedly caused extensive pollution on the Baltic coastline (particularly in the Gulf of Finland area). A case in point is the 2004 oil spill which killed tens of thousands of seabirds on the Estonian North-Eastern coast. The polluter was never identified. Such examples can already be counted in dozens.

It is plain and clear that the Baltic Sea is not an open sea. The water circulation pattern has its particularities. The Baltic is an almost closed off internal sea where the water circulates through the narrow Danish straits (i.e. Great and Little Belt and Oresund). This is why the ecological situation of the Baltic Sea requires closer international attention.

It is with unpleasant surprise that we recorded a new security risk in the Baltic Sea region - the Nord Stream gas pipeline - which has in actual fact reached construction phase. The planned pipeline would run on the bottom of the Gulf of Finland around the Western Estonian islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa and the Eastern coast of the island of Gotland. The route would pass through sites where thousands of WW I and WW II sea mines were buried, most of them anchor mines. In addition, 80,000 sea mines were scattered in the Gulf of Finland during the WW II, thousands of which are still in place and possibly active. Although Estonian navy has cooperated with fleets of other countries of the region (Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania), and also with those of the Netherlands, USA, Denmark, Germany etc, to locate and destroy hundreds of sea mines in the coastal sea of Estonia and Latvia, it is clear that these extremely dangerous activities could be continued for years to come.

However, the pre-eminent ecological threat to the Baltic Sea probably arises from the extremely toxic chemicals, such as chemical weapon components sarine, somane, yprite and others, buried by Russia and Germany in the centre of the Baltic Sea during and after the WW II.

The barrels are by now heavily corroded from decades of exposure to sea water, and any contact with them might result in a catastrophe of unprecedented scale to the Baltic Sea ecosystem as well as to the lives and health of everyone living in the countries around it.

These and other possible catastrophic consequences of building the underwater Nord Stream pipeline have been repeatedly highlighted by numerous governments: Polish, Swedish, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Danish. The European Parliament has also woken up to the issue. Discussions on the topic in the relevant European Parliament committees lead to the general conclusion that if the Baltic Sea ecosystem and region should appear to be compromised by the planned pipeline, the Commission, the Council and the Member States must do all in their power to prevent the construction of the pipeline in the extent planned by Nord Stream.

The pressure on the marine bio-system of the Baltic is first and foremost the result of the general maritime policy of the European Union, which actively favours the development of maritime activities in the Member States. This has lead to a dramatic increase in the number of ships operating on the Baltic.

All this forces the countries of the Baltic Sea region to commit further to the protection of the ecological environment on legislative as well as practical level. The result is a gradually tightening cooperation between the competent authorities of various countries.

In this context, the deepening and purposeful cooperation between the Baltic Sea countries has an important practical and tangible significance for the whole EU. It is an example to be followed.

Source: Vision de la Défense Européenne / European Defence vision, September 2008
This article is also published in the "Défense" magazine of IHEDN, October 2008 edition: La sécurité aux frontières septentrionales maritimes de l'Europe

Stalinism Was Just as Bad as Nazism

2008-08-07

Last week Russia furiously attacked President Bush for his proclamation on Captive Nations Week (July 20-July 26), which was established to raise awareness of countries living under communist and other oppressive regimes. Mr. Bush said that, "In the 20th century, the evils of Soviet communism and Nazi fascism were defeated and freedom spread around the world as new democracies emerged."

The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that treating Nazi fascism and Soviet communism as "a single evil" was an insult that "hurt the hearts" of World War II veterans in Russia and in allied countries, including the United States. "While condemning the abuse of power and unjustified severity of the Soviet regime's internal policies, we nevertheless can neither treat indifferently attempts to equate Communism and Nazism nor agree that they were inspired by the same ideas and aims," the ministry said in a statement.

Actually, the Bush statement is correct: There is really no big difference between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. When World War II began in September 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were allies; indeed Stalin and Hitler launched the war together.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty of Aug. 23 was a nonaggression pact between Germany and Russia; but a secret protocol in the treaty also opened the way for the division of Europe by carving Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania into spheres of influence. Germany invaded Poland on Sept. 1 from the north, south and west; Stalin invaded Poland from the east on Sept. 17.

And this was only the beginning. The second campaign of the war was Soviet aggression against Finland in November 1939; only the third campaign, against Denmark and Norway (in April) was a pure German operation. The fourth campaign, the invasion of France in May 1940, was accompanied by Stalin's annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In this period, Stalin was a most devoted ally of Hitler. Without Soviet oil and grain, Hitler would probably not have survived the first year of the war. Stalin even ordered European communists not to help their governments fight against Hitler.

In occupied countries, Poland for example, the Nazi Gestapo and the Soviet NKVD worked hand in hand. Germany's secret police killed people in its zone of occupation according to racial criteria. In its zone, the Soviet secret police killed according to social or political criteria. The Nazi SS handed over Ukrainian nationalists to the Soviets; in return the NKVD handed over escaped German communists to the Gestapo.

Only when the two totalitarian leaders could not agree how to divide the world did war between them come. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941; the resulting anti-Nazi coalition helped the West survive and come out of the war with half of Europe rescued from totalitarianism. But for the rest of Europe under communist control, World War II ended only in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet empire.

In his marvelous book, "No Simple Victory," British historian Norman Davies asks us to remember that "the war in Europe was dominated by two evil monsters, not by one. Each of the monsters consumed the best people in its territory before embarking on a fight to the death for supremacy. The third force in the struggle -- the Western Powers -- was all but eliminated in the opening stage, and took much of the war to reassert its influence."

This statement in no way insults the millions of people who fought against the Nazis. The victims of the crimes of Stalin and Hitler included the people of the Soviet Union. Soviet losses in World War II were very high, according to some estimates, including by Mr. Davies, 27 million soldiers and civilians. But these losses not only include those killed by the German invasion; they also include people killed by communist repressions and deportations, as well as the killings by the Soviets of their own soldiers. Mr. Davies thinks that the number of Soviet soldiers killed by the NKVD could exceed the total number of battle deaths of the British and U.S. armies.

So why, in some quarters, are the crimes of communism not yet condemned? There are still many people who say that, whilst the crimes of Nazism were proven and condemned in the Nuremberg Trials, the crimes of communism still need investigation. Others hesitate to condemn communism because, knowing that Hitler saw in Bolshevism its main opponent, they fear to share a common position with the Nazis.

This is not a logical position. If we find two gangsters fighting each other and one of them kills another, this does not make the first gangster less of a criminal.

Communist terror was in the same league of infamy as the crimes of the Third Reich. It actually lasted longer, killing significantly more people than the Nazis did. This does not make Nazis better than communists. They were both fighting against freedom and human dignity, and must be condemned in the same way as evils of the 20th century.

Mart Laar, a former prime minister of Estonia, is a founder of the Foundation for the Investigation of Communist Crimes.

Lessons for Europe from the first massive cyber-attack against a country

2008-07-09

By and large, a year has passed since Estonia suffered under an orchestrated and organized barrage of cyber attacks. The acts themselves lasted for weeks and targeted key governmental and private web sites, and selected critical information infrastructure while using a wide array of offensive techniques. At the highest moments, the amount of cyber traffic from outside Estonia targeting governmental institutions was hundreds of times higher than the "normal" levels.

Already in 2004, an idea regarding the foundation of the NATO Co-operative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCD COE) was proposed in Estonia, to be conceptualized and developed during the coming year. However, it is only fair to agree in hindsight, that the general public and political awareness of cyber threats, both domestic and especially international, rose significantly after the described events took place and that in itself boosted the process of founding the CCD COE and gave it necessary momentum. The relevant memorandum of understanding between all the participating NATO member states (Estonia as well as "donor" countries, who contribute with brains as well as other resources) is due to be signed in May and optimistically, the NATO CCD COE could be accredited within the year. But as importantly, the attacks shed light on a subject that was for long regarded as an issue for scientists and geeks, rather than something, which might have a profound effect on the everyday life of any and every, citizen.

Understandably, it is still hard to place the new asymmetric threat of cyber-terrorism (I knowingly often use different terms for that something, which we still have not found a common definition for - that is one of the first and foremost challenges, i.e to define the terms of this brand new world) on top of our every-day agenda, especially in the realm of defence issues. Technological change and evolution is probably one of the most powerful drivers of change in our societies. Darwin's gradualist view that evolution is a continuous slow process seems to hold only to an extent - it is definitely continuous but not so very slow any more. Of course, whereas Darwin probably referred to mammals, I am referring to the fast development of technology. Ironically, when age and life-experience seemed to be the necessary criteria for mature decision-making, then the rapid speed of change seems to always favour the younger generation. Perhaps that is also one of the reasons why cyber-terrorism and cyber-crimes as credible threats have taken so much time to rise on to the table of political decision-makers. Self-critically speaking - we simply lacked the understanding and knowledge and to be sure, there must be a lot of relieved scientists and officials who are "thankful" for the Estonian cyber attacks as the threats that they have fumed about for years to their superiors have finally materialized. Luckily enough, despite enormously increased traffic in the Estonian case, critical infrastructure was not harmed and the attacks were absorbed and countered in a commendable fashion. So the cost of this lesson was within the boundaries of the acceptable.

On to the decision-making. NATO, among other institutions and stake-holders has responded most forcefully. We are expecting the NATO cyber defence policy framework to be endorsed at the upcoming summit in Bucharest this April. There is a common understanding to set up a body to share information and intelligence and co-ordinate our responses in a unified and standardized manner. It is the intention of the Estonian government, along with the to be founded NATO co-operative cyber defence centre of excellence, headquartered in Tallinn (Estonia), to be on the forefront of these changes to provide clarity and solutions in order to counter these new threats as well as learn and use the technological evolution to help guard our citizens and shield our critical infrastructure from outside manipulation, provocation and direct attacks.

However, we need to recognize, that as is the case with other capabilities, NATO as well as the rest of the international community of liberal democracies is only the sum of its parts. In other words, much of the realization of our common plans lies with the national governments. And the preparedness of national governments to tackle issues related to cyber defence vary, to say the least. Nevertheless we should relentlessly pursue the adoption of mid- to long-term national strategies in order to give our internal discussions and debates (which political budgeting definitely is and the cyber defence cause will prove worthless without the allocations of necessary funds) a framework to exist in. Indeed, framing the discussion, giving it proper definitions and starting out with the right questions is what Estonia has been doing since cyber attacks occurred in April and May 2007.

The Estonian government is shortly going to pass a Cyber Security Strategy for 2008-2013. We will share our findings and ideas with our partners and friends. The vulnerability of cyber space is an asymmetric threat to our security and one of the most important prerequisites for tackling it comfortably is the correct division of responsibility, which in itself demands a high level of and indeed, the willingness for inter-institutional co-ordination. Training issues, increasing the strength and resistance capabilities of our national critical IT infrastructure (how many national governments have already taken the step to define what that is in the first place? I imagine, not too many), increasing the safety and security of different management, control, oversight and support systems, filling today's legal void with the necessary definitions and regulation, spreading more information and fostering international co-operation are all part of the necessary minimum that we must all do in order to restore the confidence of our citizens in our ability to guard them from the very real virtual threats. Because in the age of the information society, that confidence has been severely eroded.

Security has become very much an issue of perceptions. When Estonia's banks, among other institutions, were subjected to cyber attacks, then the daily routines of Estonian citizens were effectively affected. In an age, where a piece of code can down airplanes or delete billions of euros of savings the public perception of security has changed. The actors that threaten state security are becoming less and less identifiable and this is having a deep effect on international relations as well. Also the public perception of national security shifts from outside threats towards internal security and the very credibility of national governments is at stake. It is also true that in our liberal democracies the state's role has been gradually scaled down and the responsibility of the individual has increased. It remains to be seen, how can we manage this "transfer of powers" in the realm of cyber space. When hundreds of thousands of computers of careless owners can be harnessed into botnets that are used to attack the critical it infrastructure of a given country - then what is the responsibility of the owner who's PC has been infected or used because of the owner's neglect? I understand the concern for civil liberties when national governments run to curb them in order to increase national security but I ask the liberal thinkers to help define the responsibility of the individual. This would also surely have to have implications in criminal culpability.

Despite our first steps, cyber security still remains as uncharted waters for many national governments as well as the international audience. The pressure exerted by different interest groups and the reality of politics in liberal democracies means that cyber defence is just one of many priorities for a government and usually becomes a priority for the electorate only when national security is penetrated or breached. So there is all the more reason to co-ordinate and consult each other, share experiences and form active and effective networks to pool our capabilities and resources together. This has to include taking the maximum out of the work of the different networks already at our disposal: international CERT (computer emergency response team) network, NATO Computer Incident Response Capability, Interpol, Europol, international Critical Information Infrastructure Protection network, International Standardization Organisation, International Telecommunications Union, European Network and Information Security Agency, the Common Criteria network. It is alarming that the terrorists and elements of organized crime find it easy to cross ideological chasms or different interests to co-operate whereas national governments seem to keep stumbling across the smallest of possible objects to derail good intentions. Many of the international institutions are already there - we must reach out and use them for our common benefit.

Communist crimes must be condemned

2008-07-03

Some weeks ago the Foundation for the Investigation of Communist Crimes (FICC) was officially launched in Tallinn. The purpose of the foundation is to diffuse knowledge and increase international understanding of the crimes against humanity conducted by violent communist regimes across the globe in different times. The goal of the foundation is to do away with the shockingly ubiquitous illusion that any "semi-good" violent regimes - based on torture, the violation of human rights and a constant threat to life - ever existed or could exist. communist crimes need to be understood globally, and they must be condemned the same way Nazi crimes were. There are still people in the world who think that mass graves in former communist countries are somehow different from mass graves in former Nazi countries. The crimes of Nazism are condemned; it's time to do the same with communist crimes.

The main priority of the foundation is to inform the general public of the crimes committed by communist and socialist regimes in the name of a communist utopia.

The foundation's Web page ( www.communistcrimes.org ) serves as a multilevel database and interactive portal providing easier access to various subjects related to communist regimes, communist ideology and post-communist studies. Besides dissemination and international research activities, the FICC promotes social, educational and advisory programs and specific projects developed with the support of institutional and private-sector partners around the world. The foundation takes measures to publicize and memorialize the crimes of former and contemporary communist regimes. With a series of programs and projects, the foundation seeks to raise awareness of communist crimes and support the democratic opposition of the last remaining communist regimes, transitional societies and post-communist states.

Over the last 15 years, many former communist and socialist states have debated their communist past and established parliamentary and academic committees or commissions, research institutes or independent groups to investigate the crimes of the past. Their immediate purpose was not to organize trials but to establish and acknowledge facts about their past. Such truth commissions have assessed evidence and put together authoritative accounts of the communist past.

Knowledge of the events of history and the recent past is vital, as it constitutes a factual basis for open debate on the protection of natural liberties and the responsibilities of the political community. Common acknowledgement of historical facts has been and shall be a precondition for liberty. These facts, however, cannot be established without an open discussion of past events and injustices.

Post-communist states willing to deal with political responsibility for past abuses must also decide on lustration, rehabilitation, compensation and the reassessment of history. But reconciliation with the past is not only a matter for state institutions, legislation, courts or truth commissions. The large amount of existing communist crimes' research must be brought to light and the public message conveyed more clearly. State-funded institutes, committees and commissions are conducting inquiries, exhaustive studies and archive research but are often unable to disseminate their conclusions. In this view, the FICC's mission is to spread existing knowledge and make a difference in global awareness and understanding of the crimes of communist regimes.

When we really want to condemn communist crimes, we must work together. So our foundation is looking for partners. Send your stories, materials, studies and documents to our Web page. Our goal is to create real partnerships among the people and organizations who are interested in restoring the truth and creating a better future - not only for their own countries, but for the world.

Echoes of 1930s in Russian annexation

2008-04-17

Vladimir Putin, the outgoing Russian president, on Wednesday accelerated Moscow's creeping annexation of Georgian territories to sweeping annexation. This is a victory for hardliners who pressed Mr Putin to give the order before he moves from the Kremlin to the Russian White House as prime minister. It comes as Georgian proposals for peaceful settlements in the territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, languish. The west must shake off its torpor, condemn Mr Putin's gambit and support the Georgian proposals. Ignoring Moscow's Soviet-style land-grab would intensify strife in the south Caucasus.

According to Mr Putin's "instruction", Russia will open "representations" in the two territories to protect the interests of Russian citizens there and to foster co-operation. Russia will claim that it has many citizens to protect in the two Georgian territories, after it illegally distributed its passports to anyone remaining after the civil wars and ethnic cleansing of the 1990s.

"Those who cannot learn from history," said George Santayana, the Spanish philosopher, "are doomed to repeat it." In 1937, Hitler agitated for the rights of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia; in 1938, he annexed Sudetenland into the Reich, purging it of non-Germans. In Abkhazia, most Georgians, Armenians, Estonians, Greeks and Russians - perhaps 500,000 in all - are already gone. Russia recognises Georgia's international boundaries, but its actions belie its words.

Russia's "representations" will be less than official consulates, although consular services will be offered from offices in neighbouring bits of Russia. "Representation" is a euphemism to soothe western fears that Moscow may recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in tit-for-tat retaliation for western recognition of Kosovo. However, in Moscow's insidious gambit, the "representations" will be among the final steps toward annexation of the two Georgian territories.

The instruction allows Russian ministries and even Russian regions to open "representations" in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, the capitals of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is a stratagem to install in two Georgian territories government apparatus typical of autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. Just as legal acts, corporate entities and documents of one autonomous republic are recognised throughout the Russian Federation, so too will be legal decisions, companies and papers of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This will incorporate the two territories into the Russian legal space.

Consider Moscow's widening gait in the context of over a decade of creeping annexation. Russia maintains a near-total embargo on Georgia - no road, rail or sea links; no commerce, bank transactions or mail.

In March, Russia withdrew from the 1996 Commonwealth of Independent States restrictions on Abkhazia, including those that barred transfer of military equipment and assistance. Russia also opened to Abkhazian contractors lucrative contracts associated with the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The net effect is to include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Russian economic space while maintaining formidable barriers against trade with the rest of Georgia.

The threat of force is never deeply submerged. Last November, Georgia reported that additional T-72 tanks, Grad multiple launch rocket systems, armoured personnel carriers, howitzers and about 200 new Russian troops had appeared in Abkhazia.

The authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are Russian subsidiaries. Moscow is taking big steps during the lull afforded by America's presidential transition and by the hope of many European leaders for improved relations with Dmitry Medvedev, incoming Russian president.

Meanwhile, the west appears deaf and dumb to Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili's offer on March 28 of unprecedented autonomy for Abkhazia in Georgia. Georgia's proposal of a new negotiating format for South Ossetia fares no better. Western political autism is irresponsible. The west must awake and unite, not to oppose Russia or support Georgia, but to stand up for its ideals. It must send Mr Medvedev a strong signal that the path to better relations lies only in repudiating the Putin instruction and engaging on the Georgian peace proposals.

"The belief that security can be obtained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal delusion," said Winston Churchill just before Munich - we should have learnt the lesson 70 years ago.

The writer is former Estonian prime minister and an adviser to the government of Georgia

Baltic countries need more cooperation on energy

2008-03-19

Looking at the Baltic energy policy the only thing which is clear is that nothing is clear. Some years ago common energy projects like the new Ignalina power plant looked to become examples of Baltic cooperation, now Baltic countries are moving in more and more different directions. The Ignalina project is still there, but progress there has been so painfully slow and an outcome so unclear that both Latvian and Estonian governments have started looking for alternatives. Estonia is discussing an option to build its own nuclear power plant, Latvia is planning to build two new power plants - one of them based on Russian gas and the other on Russian coal.

Dependence on Russian gas and lack of necessary interconnections in the European direction requires a greater unity between us than we have had up to now. We are under strong political pressure. By playing on the interests of various circles in different Baltic states, it is regrettably quite easy for Russia to divide us. We should also not forget that the Eastern side may soon start experiencing difficulties with supplies, as the necessary investments into new gas fields and infrastructure have not been made.
It's the same with electricity. It looks at the moment quite tempting to overcome European climate directives buying cheap electricity from Russia. We can of course ask can we really save the planet, but even more practical is to ask how long can Russia provide such cheap energy to Baltic markets. Russian energy systems are under higher and higher tensions. There are doubts can they really provide the necessary electricity even for Russia's own growing needs.

What must we then do? First - we must be really serious about cooperation. The Baltic countries need a common energy policy and Baltic leaders must deliver it. This demands clear political will. A common energy policy must become a top priority in Baltic cooperation, if we can not achieve real results there, we all will be in trouble. At the same time we can also concentrate on some concrete projects, which are necessary for all three Baltic countries, whatever solution for our energy needs we select. First of them are electricity grids - we need direct connections with Europe - via Finland, via Sweden and via Poland, and the best way to achieve this is to cooperate.

Another important topic is the energy charter. The Baltic states need to upgrade their cooperation to draw their European partners' attention to the fact that the European Union should not be abandoning the Energy Charter Treaty which represents EU values, free markets and the rule of law. More specifically, this means making the European-Russian cooperation dependent on the ratification of the Energy Charter by Russia. By signing the Energy Charter, Russia of her own free will agreed to its conditions and requirements. Therefore, she must now keep the legal commitments she has undertaken. Pursuant to Energy Charter article 45(1), Russia is legally bound even if the treaty has not yet been ratified by her.

In case of possible cut-offs of gas supplies or threats of that kind, it provides a functioning mechanism of dispute settlement, which will be helpful in cases like Druzhba in Lithuania, for instance. The energy charter is also a better opportunity than NordStream for timely and well priced supply of gas into Europe. When it comes to the Baltic states, it reduces their dependency on Russia. The energy charter also supports open energy markets, which in turn can be used to ease the hold the Gazprom monopoly has both in Russia and Europe. Energy relations in the Eastern direction currently lack rules and norms. Therefore, the EU must in no way back off from the Charter's requirements nor water them down. It is in the best interests of the Baltic states themselves to take coordinated action in this field and to make joint comments.

Marko Mihkelson on Bela Kádár's "How Europe should address the challenges of the 'Asian century'"

2008-02-25

Sir,

It's hard to dispute Bela Kadar's view that we are going to have to rejuvenate the European Union in order to keep pace with our global competitors, especially the emerging Asian giants. But there's no need for excessive pessimism. I doubt that any of the present European leaders wants to relegate the EU to a dusty museum of economic history. And the anticipated arrival of the "Asian century" will shake up the world economy, not just Europe.

Indeed, I believe that intensified competition from Asia will spur the EU into renewed internal market reforms and further opening of our economies. The Lisbon strategy to make the EU the world's most dynamic knowledge-based economy may well remain a pipe dream. But that doesn't mean that "innovation" and the pursuit of knowledge-based industries are any less important ambitions. Given sufficient political will, both ideas can be put into practice.

I also think that internal forces are driving Europe towards a fundamental reformation, as well as external competition from Asia. Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, Europe has changed drastically. How far away that divided continent seems, polarized as we were by our Cold War dependencies on the Soviet Union and the USA. In my opinion, the European Union today is more independent of mind than ever before. Certainly, we need to do more to regain a competitive edge on world markets. But now the Reform Treaty has been agreed by Europe's leaders, and so long as ratification goes according to plan this year, there is good reason to hope that the EU-27 can demonstrate greater efficiency and determination.

European nations can also be expected to close ranks in the face of growing tensions over global security, including worldwide fears about energy supplies. I see no other way for Europe to counter these ultra-serious challenges than to unite behind a common policy. In capital cities across Europe, both large and small, you can feel the need for the EU to present a more united front in an unstable world.

Personally, I am convinced that the European Union can only maintain its position in world politics, let alone strengthen its global role, if we develop a common understanding of our strategic objectives. This is a prerequisite for implementing collective measures that correspond to the challenges we face. To achieve greater internal harmony, we also need a shared sense of identity. This will be hard to achieve so long as we underline our differences; it would therefore be useful to develop a more unified "narrative" of our combined experiences as Europeans. Ultimately, the EU will also have to define the boundaries within which we can agree upon a shared European "self-image". We don't yet know exactly where these borders will be, nor if a United States of Europe will exist by, say, 2050. Only one thing is certain, the development of the European Union does not stop today.

Real Threats of the Imaginary World

2007-11-28

Statemen's Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
"Cyberspace: A New Security Dimension at Our Fingertips"

Speech by the minister of defense of the Republic of Estonia, Mr. Jaak Aaviksoo

Mr. Chairman, the audience, ladies, and gentlemen, dear friends who you've gathered here to listen to what I think is important when we think about our common future.

I've titled my talk as "Real Threats of the Imaginary World." And it's really a pleasure to be here in Washington today. And even more so, I'm glad to be hosted by the Center of Strategic and International Studies and have the opportunity to present you the Estonian views on cyber security here at the Statesmen's Forum.

I'd like to start from a small trip back into the history. It's in here in the U.S. when the Wright brothers started to conquer the airspace. And we know what importance airspace now has for our national and global security. It's equally remarkable that the cyber space was born here a few decades ago when the first two computers were taught to talk to each other. The good news was that they were able to do that and to communicate the good news. The bad news is that now, they are able to communicate bad news to each other, not only between two or three computers, but hundreds and millions of computers worldwide.

So where we are today? We are in a world where, in addition to the classical dimensions of land, sea, and air, we have a virtual reality; we use the term cyberspace. There is similarly a manner as going out to the high seas created new global powers, as conquering the air space for defense, but also for global dominance, we entered airspace and further to the space. It is imminent I think that the future developments will see conflicts, attacks, if you like wars in this newly born cyberspace.

Differently from the three dimensions I have mentioned before - land, sea, and air - where we are more or less able to define natural borders, and to do understand what we mean by saying, we want to assure natural sovereignty of our national land, sea, and air space. The imaginary cyberspace has essentially no borders. As it was born, it was global. It was not only global in the sense of having no borders, but it introduced also unparalleled anonymity. As by now little legal - both national as well as international - legislation, and it's an essentially dimension which requires modest financial means to be visible and present in that space. That basically means that it's fundamentally asymmetric.

I think we are more or less have developed a joint understanding when we say what we mean by national defense in the classical sense. That is, to live in our secure borders within the national space and sovereignty imposed by our legislator and executive and judicial powers. Neither legislative nor executive nor judicial powers are as yet present in the cyber space. However, in the real world, we increasingly feel the impact of this imaginary cyber space on our every day life.

The synapses between the cyberspace and the real space increase in influence what happens in the real space, but increasingly more, also how we feel, what we think, how safe we are, and what possible and imaginary threats may threaten us. With this in mind, we can imagine that a simple or minute waves of electronic origin can cause as big a damage as a cruise missile or even a nuke. At least, it's possible and no one presently can exclude such things happening in the future.

We have entered a new era. And coming from Estonia, as you well know, it's not an imaginary, but a real threat that we experienced a few months ago.

The Estonian experience - of course, cyber attacks of different kinds, starting from classical hacking into databases and computer systems, spreading viruses, a new type of cyber attacks has emerged, attacking so far individual businesses, maybe also personal websites, sometimes more or less politically motivated, but never implemented on a national level. I think it's fair to say that the level of organization is political motivation as well as the level of coordination and the volume, which for a small country like Estonia, clearly reached national security levels, took place in the end of April and early May this year.

Most of you surely know that this was related to the political decision to move a Soviet-era monument or actually relocate it to a military cemetery because, over the last years, with raising and externally provocated conflicts between different interest groups in Estonia forced the government to relocate this symbolic place in the center of the Estonian capital. Most of the attacks were carried out against Estonian governmental websites and servers, but also against Estonian news portals, against two biggest banks in Estonia, and later all of the other commercial banks as well as several Internet service providers and telecoms.

Just for your imagination, at the highest moments of cyber attacks, the overall traffic from outside Estonia was more than 400 times higher than the normal rate. You may imagine what happens if you have 400 times more cars on the streets of Washington than usual. This was clearly felt on the national level. And taking into account the tensions around the relocation of the monument and the street riots that broke out afterwards, the people who were news-thirsty could not get access to online news. At the same time, the bank transactions that in Estonia to more than 90 percent are carried out via Internet were not possible.

We may ask what was the aim of those attacks? If they were aimed at making some real damage to our critical infrastructure, or even more specifically, attacking classified networks under the responsibility of the ministry of defense, then this was not the case. I think these attacks clearly showed that there is a huge potential to combine cyber attacks and the also recently emerged terroristic attacks. And I tend to term the events that took place in Estonia earlier this year as cyber-terrorism.

What made those attacks unusual was not their massive nature, but also the well-coordinated nature of those attacks. This was clearly not a spontaneous response accompanying political events. They had not included not only the events around the relocation of the Soviet-era monument in Tallinn, but also demonstrations and blockage of the Estonian embassy in Moscow.

These attacks were carried out in a very precise timeframe and, at large, were carried out by groups of organized computers, so-called bot nets or robotic networks, that were rented for that purpose and rented by clearly illegal groups that have hijacked a
number of computers worldwide, zombify them by malware that can be used attacking any target in the world, any time you wish, provided you have access to these networks and have the command of them.

So surely, behind those attacks were actors besides disgruntled or outraged civilians, also more organized structures. For the time being, there is no solid evidence whatsoever what we can use to putting the blame for organizing those events. Part of that fact is essential because it's related to the very character of the cyber space, its anonymity. Partly because this was clearly carried out in an undercover manner, all we can say is to see the correlation with other events that were at least partially coordinated and funded by the diplomat representation of our big neighbor.

Of course, here in the states, in some way or the other the biggest country in the world, whose defense budget as I recently learned is at least 1,000 times bigger; the same proportions apply to our national wealth. The extent of those attacks, however, posed a serious threat to Estonian sovereignty. These attacks didn't have the long-term consequences. Some of these attacks were efficiently neutralized and by large with the help of our friends both at home and abroad.

What were the objectives? As I said before, the impact of the attack was, first and foremost, of psychological nature and caused intimidation in the general populous. It created widespread confusion and miscommunication in the general public as well as making impossible online access to information use from Estonia in those turbulent times.

From that experience, I'd like to draw a few conclusions. Today, I think we can be fully confident that cyber attacks and maybe possibly cyber wars - although, I'm not willing to use this term since it has no real content for the time being - is not a possibility; it's not a theoretical concept, but may become and has, at least in one case, become a reality.

It, of course, makes especially the countries and systems the more vulnerable the more developed their electronic infrastructures are. But it's not never limited to those countries with developed infrastructures, at least any country who uses modern information technology is potentially under attack. We're used to those attacks at individual businesses, as said, sometimes political motivated if we think about the cartoon scandal of the Danish newspaper, for instance, but also in a number of other cases.

For us for the future, to handle those cyber attacks on the national level and linking the national security framework, it is very important to be able to define from what level these attacks can be handled as internal problems of individual businesses or individual organizations, maybe even individual national agencies, and from where on this has to be handled as a national security threat with corresponding responsibilities of respective authorities. One thing is clear; we have to tackle those problems in the nearest future. The threats, the probability of those threats, is rising in time.

Secondly, this threat is fundamentally global. Any country or any organization or part of it can be attacked at any time, at the same time. The attack itself is global. In the case of Estonia, we estimate that around one million computers were involved in those attacks at different times, being located in more than 50 countries worldwide. The biggest numbers come from the countries with biggest numbers of computers. This system is not selective and it's penetrating any national borders.

It is also - since the very nature of this global threat, it's impossible to try to fight it building imaginary marginal lines around our countries or agencies. This, in this cyber space, the location of the opponent is only rarely known. And its location is next to impossible to know beforehand. Even after a cyber attack, its specific origin is often very difficult to identify. Seeing as almost every computer in the world is connecting to Internet, perpetrators find it at times very easy to use malprotected personal computers to participate in attacks by controlling them remotely. By this way, a person from Austin, Texas, could be involved in an attack originating from an altogether different continent, even without knowing it.

Taking part in a recent security-related conference, together with Deputy Undersecretary Grimes, we asked the audience that according to statistics, there are at least two cyber terrorists in this audience because, most probably, their computers have been hijacked and can be used, attacking other computers wherever in the world. (Laughter.) The number in this room is somewhat smaller since the audience is less, but nevertheless, I think we have to think about to what extent we can be sure that our computers are not used for those purposes.

From here on, I'd like to continue with stating that there is a general lack of awareness and preparation against possible cyber attacks. Of course, in most ministries of defense and other critical infrastructure organizations, the people are ready and able to fight those threats from the cyber space. At the same time, the general audience, especially all of the computer owners are in most cases not reasonably well-prepared and aware of the possibility of those threats and to what extent they on one hand can be vulnerable, and on the other hand, willingly or unwillingly participate in those attacks.

It is a complicated question to what extent individual people or computer owners can be held responsible for those attacks. Will I just bring you a small mental exercise. In a war, in a regular war, guns are used as weapons to fight. In cyber attacks, computers are the weapons. We have made rules and regulations so anybody who owns a gun has to keep it from being used against third parties, either by leaving it at home on the table accessible to your children and them using it against their friends or classmates, then it's clear that we can be held responsible.

More or less, the same is true in the case of cars if we leave our cars' doors open and keys inside. If somebody takes the car and causes an accident or damage to third parties, we are held liable. What about computers? Are we authorized, in the future, to put the burden on individual computer owners to protect their computers from against using them in cyber attacks or cyber wars? The question is so far unanswered. It clearly is an important question since it interferes with individual liberties to the extent that we have to be extremely cautious before legislating into that sensitive area.

Fourth, cooperation between public and private sector is vital. Our modern information systems and networks are fundamentally intertwined. In addition to defense-related classified networks, which in most cases are reasonably well protected, information systems of our critical infrastructure, which in very many cases are in private ownership, are not always subject to the same strict regulations. It's clear and most of the countries, to a different extent, are paying increasingly more attention to that.

On the other hand, it's clear that fighting those threats has to involve both governmental agencies and offices as well as the private sector in close cooperation. Even more so, we're taking into account the very nature of those attacks; they are speed; events happen in milliseconds or even in shorter time periods. They develop over minutes or hours. And so, fast reaction is essential. That basically means that the pre-prepared networks of a well-established command and control lines must be in place before things happen. We're only halfway, in most of the countries, to achieve that goal.

And last, but not least, the fifth conclusion - when handling the cyber attacks and possible cyber conflicts and cyber terrorism, the first obstacle we confront is the lack of conceptual space even in communicating what is going on. What was going on and what was happening? As I said before, a cyber attack is maybe the best-established term to denote attacks from an external force towards an concrete target. What about cyber terrorism, cyber wars, and other terminology? There is no agreement whatsoever on national and even more so on international level.

So the conceptual clarity is the first step on that way. The second is to try to agree on certain rules of how to handle and what can be considered a cyber crime. Again, this is a heavily under-regulated sector and it's very hard, even if we managed to establish the ones who can be held responsible, it is very hard to bring those people to justice and clearly more national as well as international efforts by our well-respected judicial authorities is necessary.

As I pointed out before, the problem itself reduces to a risk-management exercise. The possible events that may happen in cyberspace have to be handled and the risks minimized. Minimizing the risks is always brings with itself certain burdens, either by law or voluntarily taken upon different stakeholders. As I said before, these threats cannot alone be managed by governments; it has to involve both businesses, third-sector organizations as well as individuals. How to handle this burden sharing is a complicated issue that has to be addressed if we want to efficiently handle the possible extension of cyber conflicts in cyber space.

And from here on, there is a need to establish clear responsibilities between different stakeholders in that counter-cyber attack exercise. So, from these five major conclusions, I'd like to say a few words what we've done in Estonia on the national level.

First, we started and even speeded up the process of compiling national cyber security strategy. This document will be ready the end of this year, and I said before, this tries to conceptualize the phenomenon, define the critical infrastructure, put concrete responsibilities on developing necessary legislation, as well as asking from Internet service providers as well as telecoms and other extensive e-service providers to develop countermeasures to be able to confront any future attack.

As said before, it also includes certain guidelines for the private sector. In addition to that, in the June meeting in Brussels, the NATO defense ministers, partly on the proposal by Estonian governments, commonly agreed that urgent work was needed to enhance the ability to protect information systems of critical importance to the alliance. Estonia, on its behalf, has proposed more than a year ago, so long before the cyber attacks took place, to establish a NATO cooperative cyber defense center of excellence in Estonia. I'm glad that now, five countries have committed themselves to contribute and several others are in the process of negotiations to participate.

We are extremely thankful for the publicity we had due - or thanks to the cyber attacks early April this year. This is the positive side of the story - (laughter). We have modest resources; we could have never managed that publicity to our cyber activities in Estonia. Furthermore, we are - we are deeply convinced that increased international cooperation is needed to handle those new threats from cyberspace.

Interestingly enough, confronting the threats from the cyberspace, we have from the very beginning to adopt what we nowadays call a comprehensive approach. We see that the comprehensive approach is increasingly an issue in traditional conflicts, or at least semi-traditional conflicts, which NATO as an alliance and our coalition face in Iraq and Afghanistan. We see that boundaries become increasingly dissolved between the international and domestic affairs, between civil and military spheres, between the private and the public, between peace and conflict. This is essentially characteristic to every cyber conflict or cyber attack at the same time.

Who should raise those issues? Who should try to address those challenges? Since this issue has clearly become a problem of national security, at least those countries joining their hands in fighting traditional security threats should pay due attention to fighting cyber attacks in today, and increasingly so, tomorrow. NATO has played, for over 60 years, a leading role in guaranteeing security, in Euro-Atlantic space and, increasingly more so in modern days, worldwide. It has, I hope, both the willingness and the potential to address those issues. A number of countries have embarked on that process already, as I said before, the willingness to address those issues was underlined during the recent meeting of defense ministers in Noordwijk, and most potently, the most corresponding policy of cyber defense will be tabled to - on the summit meeting in Bucharest next spring.

Beyond the activities in the framework of NATO, I think also other organization, first and foremost at least from the Estonian point of view, the European Union as well as the Council of Europe, should undertake steps in that direction. It's worthwhile to mention that there already exists an international convention on cyber crime that was approved by the council of Europe and that came in to force back in 2004. Unfortunately, very few countries have decided to join this convention; however, what we observe - the interest to work more closely, both in ratifying that convention as well as extending it to the new spheres of cyber crime and cyber attacks is underway.

However, it is also important to note that as it stands now, this convention on cyber crime of the Council of Europe is the only international agreement that concerns cyber crime. Taking into account the threats related to that, that's clearly on the critical. I think that having more signatories would be beneficial to every country that faces the emerging cyber security environment, and in addition to that it could act as a basis for any further legislation, as such arises in member states or further away.

As an organization of like-minded countries, the European Union is another actor that could do much in the effort of improving cyber security. Seeing as many NATO countries are also member of the EU, it would present a good opportunity to deal with the issues considered in NATO, also in the EU. And I am glad to say that the ministers of Justice of the European Union are increasingly paying attention to that sector and trying to legislate both at the European as well as national levels. Of course, it will be redundant for the European Union to replicate the work that NATO is already doing. For example, the EU could deal with cyber crime of commercial nature and as a part of that, implement legislation aimed at a wider range of issues that cyber security presents.

Furthermore, in addition to these international organizations, I am sure that cooperation between individual states, also bilateral relations can essentially contribute to facing that threat. However, we think that we have to find also new frameworks to work with these challenges. The approach to cyber security, I think, should be proactive, all-encompassing, and most of all, multilateral, a cooperative effort between governments, the private sector, and international organizations.

Now, I am getting a little bit more philosophical. When I was trying to draw a picture to resolve the threats and how to fight them, we have to be realistic in what we can achieve and what is proportional reaction to the possible threats. It is clear that as in handling crime, we can never achieve or legislate means and measures so that crime will disappear completely. There is always a tolerable level of regular crime as well as cyber crime and cyber attacks, beyond which the measures undertaken are too big a burden for the participating partners, as well as ineffective from the point of view of resources spent. However, whatever we undertake, a critical part of that, while we've failed at most, I think, even if we are able to identify the evil, is to bring the evil to justice. Bringing the evil to justice today is extremely hard, not only within national borders, however here certain success is possible and this country is a good example of being able to implement certain rules, but it's even more so on the international level.

Just one example - I don't know to what extent of confidence - we have identified as one of the attackers during the cyber attacks in Estonia as originating as originating and working from the conflict zone of Transnistria, he openly declared that according to the laws of that disputable part of Moldavia, his actions and attacks were fully legal. This has been also officially referred to by some of the authorities we addressed to expel the corresponding person to Estonian authorities.

Dear Sirs and Madams, I'm starting to conclude. Globalization has made the world smaller; we are increasingly interrelated in everything that we do. The threats that are born in one part of the world reach our doorsteps faster than we wish that happen. We've had to reconsider a number of concepts that were able to handle conventional threats and conflicts. And we, I think, are increasingly aware to what extent we are sitting in the same boat.

Even more so, we are increasingly aware to what extent the problems we face are intertwined; intertwined in the physical and the cyber space, the legal space, national and international security interests, and so on. The more we are interrelated and intertwined, dependent on each other, the more we have to share jointly the responsibility for global as well as national and personal security.

I'm extremely happy standing here today, that Estonia, together with a number of other countries have joined into the Euro-Atlantic organizations standing for common values. I'm also sure that the number of countries and people who share the same values is growing in the future. I see that - I saw that happening over the last years and Estonia was one of those countries who joined these organizations this millennium. I'm sure that some of our adversaries today will be part of that alliance in the coming decades, however complicated that journey might be.

This, I think, is our common responsibility to move ahead despite the problems, despite the fact that not everything is easy and all -we definitely cannot solve all the problems as soon as we may wish, be it then the conventional conflict somewhere far or near from our borders, as well as the new threats that challenge us in cyberspace. But let me express my deep conviction that if we join our hearts and minds and brains, we'll be able to solve them, so thank you for your attention.

Why it is time to give our kids a voice, too

2007-10-18

Estonia led the way in e-government and fighting cyber wars. Now its experiment in reversing the collapsing birth-rate is attracting international attention.

My country is leading the pack in terms of ageing. By 2030 the proportion of elderly people will rise from today's 18% to 26%. Since 2003 various policies have been tried to stimulate the birthrate, the best-known and most expensive being grants to parents to compensate for loss of salary while a parent is at home with a child. This is currently paid for 18 months, with a ceiling of €1,500 per month, which will rise to €2,000 next year (equivalent to three average monthly salaries).

Students and the unemployed are guaranteed the equivalent of the minimum wage for the same period, around €250 per month.

The state also cancels 50% of graduates' student loans once the first child has been born, 75% for the second, and 100% for a third. And from 1 January next year there will be sliding and very generous income tax relief. In the first year of the remuneration scheme for parents, 900 more children were born than in the year before (up to 13,900 from 13,000). But it has to be said that these babies were often born to women who had postponed having a child until the last possible moment. This is precisely why the demographic trends are so worrying, not just in Estonia, but across Europe.

Younger women need to be encouraged to become mothers and to conceive before they are 25, in which case there is a much better chance of having a second or third child. This means in practice subsidising them and safeguarding their careers so that they can stay at home with their children.

While such policies do have an impact, they are expensive and not enough to turn round a trend which will result in fewer and fewer taxpayers to pay for a growing number of people needing medical care and pensions.

Has the time come to look at societal decision-making in a way which correlates with voters" contributions to their societies? What if parents had one extra vote per child? I proposed this idea in the 2007 parliamentary elections and while it might seem radical at first glance, it is actually quite logical and fair. After all, we find it reasonable that parents represent their children in legal terms until they are adults. Why not in elections? It would in effect demonstrate the value that the state places on those who will be its future.

There are those who say this risks creating baby-factories for claiming subsidies. But unemployed mothers everywhere in Europe already get fairly generous subsidies; it has simply not happened. As for the principle of one-man one-vote, why should it be set in stone?

Above all, the advantage of parents' having more votes would be to force decision-makers to think in a longer-term perspective.
The response to the idea, which has also been proposed in Finland and Austria, has been rather positive in Estonia. Without immigration, the population in some EU member states would already be declining. Even much higher levels of both immigration and fertility would have little impact on the growing imbalance between those of working age and those over the age of 65, a process being speeded up by increasing longevity. According to Eurostat, the 65-80 age-group in the EU will rise from today's 12% to 19% in 2050. The writing is on the wall. The change I propose may soon look less like an adventure than common sense.

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Ott Lumi is a political scientist and a member of the Estonian parliament for the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union. His first child, Linda Maria, is one year old today (18 October).

Europe’s (virtual) soft underbelly

2007-09-27

MEPs discuss security and technology

Tunne Kelam

Estonia is a country with an electronic identity. Practically every possible service has also an alternative in the virtual world. Some 97% of bank transactions are carried out on-line. What happens when this virtual world is suddenly nearly paralysed?

Estonians experienced this in April and May, when their country became the target of a large scale cyber attack.

There seems to be a clear political connection between the riots of 26-27 April in Tallinn organised by Russian extremist youth groups (several of whom had entered the country from Russia) and the start of the on-line attacks that has been called the first cyber war.

The riots started in the night of 26 April. The next day, the first websites calling for the launching of attacks against Estonia appeared. Massive cyber attacks against many key government websites and several information and media infrastructures were carried out, some of which had to shut down temporarily. During these attacks, the volume of cyber traffic from outside Estonia targeting government institutions and Estonian news portals exceeded the normal rate by several hundred times. In addition, the website of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip's Reform Party was defaced.

Companies, banks and even schools were also targeted and the websites of some other political parties were defaced - for instance, fake apologies for the actions of Estonian police and vulgar political slogans in the Russian language were added. The usual method was to congest the target server's network with meaningless data from a single point of origin. Attackers used large networks of remotely controlled malware-infected computers to amplify the impact. Many Estonian news portals went off-line for a period of time, especially during the initial phase of the attacks. The comment sections of these portals were heavily bombarded by spam networks.

On 10 May, a massive attack targeted Hansapank - the biggest Estonian bank. The bank suffered a temporary loss of on-line services. In addition, Hansapank services became partially unavailable outside Estonia. On 15 May there were similar attacks conducted against SEB Eesti Ühispank - the second biggest bank. Blocking of bank websites proved to be the most effective way to hamper the everyday routine of tens of thousands of people.

Discussion is continuing on identifying the perpetrators. However, all the evidence points to well-co-ordinated, well-equipped and politically motivated activities based on impressive organisational capacities. The stage was set during the last days of April by multiple calls on Russian websites and by the massive sending of emails, most with Russian addresses, to carry out cyber attacks in Estonia. An emotional debate was conducted about how to fund the renting of servers and botnets. At the beginning of May, detailed instructions, timetables and orders to conduct the attacks were disseminated. This led to an avalanche of attacks from all over the world. During the following days the attacks became more and more organised and co-ordinated. On some peak days, it was estimated that up to one million computers had been involved.

The whole period of cyber attacks was accompanied by dramatic political and economic moves from the Russian side. The Duma delegation which came to Estonia at the beginning of May on a fact-finding mission issued an unprecedented call for the resignation of the Estonian government (which had been in office for only a few weeks following the March parliamentary elections). Indirect economic sanctions included the closure to "heavy vehicles" of the vital border bridge over the Narva River and the disruption of rail transit traffic by the sudden onset of "railway repairs". Calls via the internet to mobilise Russian-speaking young men in Estonia and elsewhere to take up arms and fight for "justice" can be seen as direct incitement to terrorist attacks. Fortunately these calls failed to find followers.

One can conclude that Estonia became a test case for future technological warfare. Considering the scale of the cyber attacks and the way they were organised, new phrases - "cyber-terrorism" and "cyber warfare" - were coined. It was important and positive that both Nato and EU institutions immediately recognised the significance and future risks of cyber attack. Unfortunately they still lack proper defences against this kind of attack. In cyberspace, international terrorism, organised crime and state-sponsored activities all easily overlap. Therefore, the challenge illustrated by the example of Estonia serves as an urgent wake-up call for a comprehensive and co-ordinated international approach to this question.

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Estonian centre-right MEP Tunne Kelam is a member of Parliament's subcommittee on security and defence.

Estonia - a needed enemy for Russia

2007-06-09

I start with a question: "What era do I describe?" Head of Russian legislative body Duma threats to cut diplomatic relations with a EU country. Official youth organisation of the Russian president's party is blocking for weeks the entrance of an embassy of an EU country in Moscow. During an interview a member of the organisation attacks the EU country's ambassador with gas. It is suddenly prohibited for one of EU member states to sell its products to Russian market.

Yes! I'm talking about the 7th year of 21st century. The headline of my article refers to probably the best summary made by professor of semiotics in Tallinn University - Mihhail Lotman - concerning provocations organized by Russia towards Estonia at the end of April. Lotman's concept is based on the comprehension that small country is a convenient enemy for Russia. Firstly, because Putin mainly chooses to provoke countries whose response is definitely civilised and secondly, no one ever really believes that Estonia could be really a threat to Russia. Lotman also succinctly compares Putin to Alexandrer the III whose favourite aphorism was: "Russia has only two allies, army and fleet."

Riots which were organised in Tallinn on the night of 27th of April regarding the removal of so called "bronze soldier," showed clearly that Russia's real interest has not been the memory of those who died during the fights in the Second World war, but to use this controversial symbol for Estonians and Russians, to destabilise the political atmosphere in Estonia. For Estonia's government it became clear already some time before the provocations started, that it is not possible to hold any longer a statue in the centre of Tallinn, which for some symbolises victory over the Nazi army, but for a large majority the start of Soviet occupation. The way how the criminals and marauders destroyed, burned down and simply stole the property in the historic Tallinn city on the already mentioned night, was clear approval that the decision to remove the statue was absolutely appropriate. For now the situation for the majority of Estonian citizens is solved, no matter their ethnicity. The bronze soldier is staying in the Tallinn military graveyard. During coming nearest weeks the buried will be placed to the same place, so they can rest there together with Estonian, Russian, British and other soldiers who have fought on the ground of Estonia.

It is quite clear that Russia had a logical ground to play demonic games with the souls of these Estonian Russian-speaking inhabitants who have deep personal relations with the topic of World War II. Both Estonians and Russians lost thousands of fellow natives in the WW II and generation who remembers this tragedy still lives among us. War and death don't choose victims and all of them are worth to commemorate. Of course, what concerns the war-graves, then Estonia is not unique in that sense.

There are hundreds of occasions in the world where reburying has taken place. For example, Egypt and Israel exchanged without any treaties in the middle of seventies remains of soldiers. Indonesia in 1991 gave to Japan the remains of 3500 soldiers. North Korea voluntarily opened the graves of 200 US soldiers who died in Korean war and gave them over to United States. Under special treaties some remains have been reburied between Russia and Finland, between Estonia and Germany and etc. So reburying remains of those died in the war to more dignified locations is not merely a normal practice, but a elementary practice of a civilised state

So let's come back to the question why Russia uses Estonia's internal matters in order to vilify Estonia's public image and also disturb normal process of integration of Russian minority into Estonian society? All the causes could be actually driven under one common denominator - identity crises and threat to inner stability what could possibly be driven out from that.

The main cause for such identity crises is the fact that Kremlin still cannot accept its realistic role in the today's world. It is weird to watch that a country with GDP per capita far behind the poorest in EU is still trying to pretend to act like an Empire, except concentrating to its internal problems. With a rapidly worsening demographic situation and critical living-conditions in many areas, it is mainly just the high level of oil prices in the world market, which makes it possible for the current Kremlin administration to play the revival of Soviet Union.

And, of course, we see evidence of some results, both symbolic and realistic. We hear Soviet anthem again in the international sports events, we have heard Putin's statement, who said that "the collapse of Soviet Union was the greatest disaster of 20th century." We have just seen the brutal action against Mr Kasparov and his allies in opposition to Kremlin. Of course, the basis of all such pseudo-empire action is in essence the fact that Russia still has not properly expounded the communist regime as such. Russia is still the main player in the international field, which opposes the criminalisation of communist totalitarian regime, which killed the same amount or even more people as Nazi regime. The decision of European Commission to organise official public discussion in one of the Baltic countries on the issue of communist crimes, is impressive.

Important factor, why Russia continuously creates image of enemies through massive propaganda is the fact of internal instability. We see that this process intensifies before every presidential election in Russia.

To conclude: Estonia is a democratic country that 16 years ago broke free from an evil empire where destiny of many nations was greatly damaged. There is no question about significant problems between different nations living in Estonia. Of course, the process of integration has its drawbacks time to time, but this is the problem we face together in different European countries.

We also face the need to finally contest some dark spots in our near history in order to cut the feet of possible false propaganda.

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Ott Lumi is a Member of Estonian Parliament, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union

Frozen conflicts 2: Handling Moscow: Tips from Estonia for Georgia and Moldova

2007-05-22

Conflicts in Georgia and other parts of the South Caucasus region owe much to Russia's "peace-keeping" policies in the region, says Mart Laar, a former Estonian prime minister. He tells how his country's experience is relevant to the resolution of these conflicts.

The fall of communism gave all the nations of the former Soviet bloc a chance to turn towards democracy, a market economy and the rule of law. But their transitions turned out to be very different. Some countries moved decisively forward, cutting their ties with the communist past, others were less successful and a few failed catastrophically. Moldova and Georgia were until very recently, in this latter category. The failure of their economic and political reform efforts was in large part due to secessionist movements actively supported by Russia, that were aimed at keeping both countries in Moscow's "sphere of influence". And then, when bloody conflicts erupted in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, Russia turned its military presences there into "peace-keeping" forces as a means of maintaining control over the region.

Of course, it's long been feared that the "frozen conflicts" of the South Caucasus region could at any moment turn hot. Not only has this not happened, but we can even talk now of possible solutions to these conflicts. And we can mainly do so because of the changes that in recent years have seen Georgia and Moldova both begin to achieve breakthroughs to a market economy and democracy. The European Union's role in helping them find solutions to their problems as part of its new neighbourhood strategy has also been very positive.

The starting point for these positive developments was Georgia's "Rose revolution" three years ago. From being perilously close to a failed state, Georgia has since enjoyed rapid progress towards democracy and has made a decisive turn towards the West and western values. The success of the various "coloured revolutions" in former Soviet-bloc countries also ignited change in Moldova, where President Vladimir Voronin launched a significant reform process and declared his aim of moving closer to the European Union. All these changes, meanwhile, sparked new initiatives in Georgia and in Moldova to find solutions to the frozen conflicts and to restore by peaceful means their countries' territorial integrity.

Estonia's experience may be of interest in assessing how best Georgia and Moldova should shape their policies vis-à-vis Russia. When Estonia gained independence in 1991 following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow was understandably angry. It sought to create a picture in the western media of a land with huge economic problems, unsuitable for investment. Estonia was indeed poor, and its main exports were scrap metal and timber, but its economy was growing.

Russia supported a so-called "autonomy-movement" in north-east Estonia, which is populated mostly by people who settled there during Soviet times. When Estonia stood firm against this, Russia started sanctions and cut off gas supplies. The few Estonian products allowed into Russia were heavily taxed and even military intervention was threatened. But Estonia kept its nerve. Russia's sanctions actually helped Estonia to re-direct its economy from east to west. Meanwhile western Europe was doing its utmost to integrate the Baltic states - Lithuania and Latvia as well as Estonia - while at the same time seeking to avoid possible conflict with Russia. Economically, with European help, Estonia eventually became one of the most successful transition countries in central and eastern Europe, joining the European Union and NATO in 2004.

Georgia, too, gained its independence in 1991. But did not receive the sort of help from western Europe that Estonia got. A 1994 free-trade treaty with the European Union enabled Estonian products to find new markets, but unfortunately the same was not the case for Georgia. The European Union's neighbourhood policy has been weak and passive, and so created no real opportunities for Georgia.

It is true that Georgia has seemed a less appealing partner than the Baltic states. Georgia's first president after independence, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was soon deposed in a coup. During the ensuing civil war, former Soviet foreign minister and native Georgian Eduard Shevardnadze joined the leaders of the coup. In 1995 he was elected president, and then re-elected in 2000. During his presidency two regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, broke away. Supported by Russia, they claimed independence. In 2003, Shevardnadze was deposed in what came to be called the "Rose revolution" after opposition politicians backed by international monitors charged that parliamentary elections had been fraudulent.

The country has done its best to live down it dismal past. A democratic Georgia has made a decisive turn to the West and western values. The economy was reformed and has grown, and the army has been strengthened. The new leadership of the country is young and dynamic and keen to move the country forward. Georgia's 12% flat rate income tax - probably the lowest in the world - has been very successful in boosting the national budget. The government has raised pensions and increased social support. Corruption is decreasing and reform of the judiciary has started. The economy grew by 8% in 2005 and more than 10% in 2006. The United States showed its approval in 2005 with a visit to Georgia by George W. Bush, the first American president to visit the country while in office. But despite all this, the European Union seems to be taking a more considerate attitude to Georgia's breakaway regions than to Georgia itself.

Georgia has tried many times to defuse tensions over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Russia accuses Georgia of aggression and of ethnic cleansing in the regions. Its main goal is to inhibit western political support for Georgia and prevent Ossetian and Abkhaz reconciliation with Georgians.

Russia, and to some extent the United States, are the powers that count in Georgia. Europe must show that it counts too, as it did in the Baltic. Estonia demonstrated that with determination and strong support from Europe, Russian pressure can be resisted, so Georgia should take heart. For a start, Europe must understand that Georgia does not need humanitarian aid but trade. Just as a trade deal with Europe allowed Estonia to find new markets, it would be the means through which Georgians are able to help themselves.

Georgia can reasonably hope that it will achieve real independence, but what is one to say about Moldova, Europe's poorest country and one threatened by Russia more than the Estonians, or indeed the Georgians, ever were?

As with Georgia, Moldova's lack of success in reforming its economy and its political system was partly the result of secessionist movements supported by Russia. It made a wretched start as a formally independent country when its industrial region of Transdniestria declared independence. Transdniestria is mostly populated by Russian and Ukrainian speakers who feared that the majority of Moldovans, who are of Romanian descent, planned closer ties with Romania. Civil war followed and in 1992 Russian peacekeepers, or occupiers, moved into Transdnistria and are still there. Transdniestria's independence has never been recognised, either by Moldova or internationally. It is said to be lawless and corrupt.

Moldova is deeply in debt, unemployment is high and its once well-regarded wine trade is in decline. Russia cuts off its gas supply from time to time, demanding more money. Many of its 4m or so people have left the country. The country's president, Vladimir Voronin, was a Moldovan government minister in Soviet times. Although still a communist, he looks longingly towards the European Union. However, only Russia, it seems, can solve the problem of Transdnistria. Moldovan officials have made five apparently fruitless visits to Moscow to plead with President Putin to explore a possible solution and withdraw the Russian "peacekeepers". An increasingly desperate Voronin has turned for help to the European Union's "border assistance mission", but an EU initiative would presumably need Russian cooperation.

The lack of up-to-date knowledge of Moldova in both the European Union and the United States became evident this April, when the two only learnt of a proposed peace deal as a result of a leaked report in Germany. "Now officials in Washington DC, and Brussels are urgently seeking clarification," reported British newsweekly The Economist. The deal would appear to be in Russia's favour, with Moldova recognising Transdnistria as a legitimate entity for the first time, and Transdnistria keeping its Supreme Soviet. "Russia has, for once, trumped the West," commented The Economist.

Estonia: Defense Minister Says Bronze Soldier Had To Go

2007-05-09

TALLINN, May 9, 2007 (RFE/RL)

As the Estonian authorities brace themselves, fearing a repeat of the riots by ethnic Russian youth that followed the removal of a Soviet World War II memorial from central Tallinn, RFE/RL correspondent Ahto Lobjakas spoke to one of the main architects of the move, Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo. Aaviksoo told RFE/RL that it was time for the Bronze Soldier to go once it became associated with forces opposed to Estonia's independence. But Aaviksoo also says the country could do more to fight ethnic discrimination.

RFE/RL: Why did the Bronze Soldier have to go?

Jaak Aaviksoo: The critical necessity of this became clear to everyone who knows anything about this matter almost exactly a year ago, on May 9 [2006]. In the course of the past few years after [Vladimir] Putin had become president [of Russia], Estonia's regained independence became subject to attacks and the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime [started being] glorified. A year ago, [the] red flags [of the Soviet Union] were flown in front of the Bronze Soldier, an Estonian tricolor was pulled down, and its bearer was forced to leave, and the police had no other way of securing public order than leaving the red flags where they were. That was the moment when many Estonian people felt they had had enough.

RFE/RL: Can you explain why the Bronze Soldier stayed where it was for more than 15 years after Estonia broke away from the Soviet Union?

Aaviksoo: We could discuss why the statue did not go in 1989, in 1991, or after the 1992 constitution. There are many reasons, and I believe a desire for reconciliation is one of them. But we must also reckon with the presence of the Soviet troops until 1994, and after they left tensions abated, a spirit of cooperation prevailed, and not that of destruction. Then came the objectives of joining NATO and the European Union, which turned our gaze towards the future, instead of the past. The conflict arose at the moment when we realized that the Bronze Soldier became part of the war against the Republic of Estonia.
RFE/RL: Who are the parties to this conflict?

Aaviksoo: It is difficult to say. I believe that Estonia is home to a whole lot of people who have been unable to accept the demise of the Soviet Union; whose self-identity, erstwhile status, and many other circumstances cause them to resent the developments that have taken place in Estonia.

RFE/RL: Would you say that either indirectly or directly, Russia is one of the participants in this conflict?

Aaviksoo: Yes, I have no doubt of that, although it would be too simplistic and irresponsible to reduce it to a standoff between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation. We revived our republic in a situation where we acquiesced to granting permanent residence to a very great number of people who had arrived [in Estonia] during the [Soviet] occupation; we allowed [Soviet] reserve officers to stay behind on the territory of the Estonian Republic; and perhaps we underestimated the corresponding risks. The riots two weeks ago are partly a consequence of those decisions. I don't think those decisions were wrong, but perhaps we are seeing today what it really means to have in Estonia a great number of people who are not reconciled to the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Estonia.

RFE/RL: In a broader Estonian context, do you accept the claim that the integration process of Estonian Russians has been put back to the beginning again, that Estonia has reached a kind of "ground zero" in interethnic relations?

Aaviksoo: I do not agree at all. Integration can be easily be broken down into two components: one political, the other substantive. The Republic of Estonia, its political, economic, and social advances rely on all parts of its population, all of them make a contribution to Estonia's advancement and I think we must not underestimate this real, everyday life.... Perhaps we have been too superficial, perhaps we have too easily thought of linguistic integration as a goal, rather as a means -- although it remains true that the Estonian and Russian communities exist in two separate information spaces. Unfortunately, language instruction alone is evidently not sufficient to join these two information spaces together. I think that in analyzing what has happened, we will be able to draw judicious conclusions from it. It would, however, be irresponsible to claim that the work the public and Estonia's institutions have done for integration has gone to waste.

RFE/RL: How do you respond to claims that Russians in Estonia face systemic discrimination, that the government pursues a policy of "Estonia for Estonians"?

Aaviksoo: This is certainly not right. But I also think that to look at why this is said, and the causes involved, is a serious question. A large number of the people who arrived in Estonia during the Soviet occupation have, for objective reasons, acquired a certain view of how things should be, and of the privileges they enjoyed during the Soviet era; and for them giving this up, adapting to a different society where matters are decided by the Estonian parliament, has been difficult....

As regards specific charges of discrimination, then there has been no recourse to the courts. I think, however, that the Estonian state would be stronger if we had been through such cases, and discussed these issues. It appears to me that there have been cases of such ethno-linguistic discrimination in the Republic of Estonia, but, unfortunately, we have either overlooked them or been unable to treat them in a manner that would befit rule of law and democracy. I think we need this, and we need to defend our positions, if called upon to do so, in the European Court of Human Rights or other international forums.

The awful truth that lies behind the bronze

2007-05-03

The monument to the Soviet 'liberation' in September 1944, the bronze soldier standing in one of Tallinn's central squares, was one of the most hated monuments in Estonia until the Soviet occupation ended 50 years later.

It is curious to discover that there are leading Western politicians and commentators who do not know this, and even believe, or claim to believe, the Russian fairy-story that the Red Army freed my country from the Nazis.

In some cases they have been shrill in their condemnation of the Estonian government's decision to move the Bronze Solider off to a war cemetery, where he surely belongs, and if anything sympathetic to the rioting and vandalism by Estonian's Russian-speaking minority.

Perhaps it is necessary to explain once again what happened on 22 September 1944. There was no fighting in Tallinn between Russian and German troops, ejected without help by Estonian soldiers who also restored their national government.

The Red Army returned as the Nazis retreated, and the flag which was ripped down from the tower of Toompea Castle was not the swastika but the blue-black-white Estonian tricolor.
The Russians had been here before, thanks to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, marching into Tallinn in October 1939 and promising not to compromise Estonian independence; similar pacts were signed with Lithuania and Latvia. All three countries were subjected to mass terror, Estonia losing nearly 20% of its pre-war population.

For them, as for the other Central and Eastern European nations, the end of Nazi occupation connected seamlessly with the (re)start of Soviet occupation commemorated by the now-famous Bronze Soldier. The memory of the real heroes was suppressed. Like the leaders of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, those who led Estonia's national resistance and had survived the struggle against the Nazis were annihilated by the NKVD.

This incidentally helps to explain why Estonians find it hard to tell the difference between Nazis and Communists.
The violent demonstrations of recent days have nothing to do with democracy in Estonia, where the glorification, let alone rebirth, of fascism is unthinkable. Rather, they are symptomatic of the Russian refusal to deal with their history by declaring the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact null and void, and apologising - as Germany did many years ago - for the death and misery which flowed from it.

Instead Russian politicians and officials are de facto encouraging the protests, with Russian diplomats in Estonia developing contacts with the extremists arrested for rioting and mass-vandalism over the last few days.
Historical truth is elusive and it is rarely easy to agree on a common view. A joint commission of historians should be given access to the archives in both Russia and in the Baltic states, and present its findings to the public and to the various parliaments.

Such a 'truth commission' may be the best way out of the current war of accusations and recriminations, and establish the basis for a better understanding between the nations.

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Mart Laar is a professional historian who was prime minister of Estonia in 1992-94 and 1999-2002.